We present to you an analysis on the uprising that has been underway in Chile produced jointly by Black Rose/Rosa Negra (US), Solidaridad (Chile), and Acción Socialista Libertaria – ASL (Argentina).

[Castellano]

One Month Since the Start of the Popular Revolt in Chile:
Feminist and Libertarian Communist Statement

A Preface to October 18th

On October 18th, a popular rebellion broke out in Santiago, Chile that quickly spread throughout the country. The demonstrations that began in response to a spike in the public transportation fare quickly transformed, in a matter of days, into a social upheaval rooted in mass discontent over 30 years of privatization and precarious economic policies. As the phrase circulating through street graffiti and social media states, “It’s not about 30 pesos, it’s about 30 years.”

The cost of living in Chile rose substantially in 2018-2019. As an example, on April 2018, the government announced a 30% increase in personal taxes applicable over the next three years. In January 2019, state officials announced a 6.4% increase in TAG (toll roads in the Santiago region). In May, electricity bills increased 10.5%. In September, the ISAPRES (private health insurance) rose 50% on average for GES premiums (associated with illnesses that the state is required to cover) while FONASA (state insurer) rose its premiums 3%. At the beginning of October, electricity rose once again 9.2%. All of this has occurred in a context in which 50% of all employees receive an income less than $400,000 Chilean Pesos ($496 USD) per month, while the cheapest rents in Santiago can run between $200,000 and $285,000 ChileanPesos ($250-350 USD). Unsurprisingly, the household debt has reached a record high of 73.3% in relationship to disposable income during 2018. The $30 peso subway increase announced in October was the spark that ignited the flame. These previously mentioned economic policies have made life precarious for the working class and was complemented by a series of state repression strategies to violently contain the growing discontent.

In Chile, the Year of Political and Social Discontent began on March 8th

2019 has been a year of milestones; the first being the March 8th Feminist Strike—a historic moment in Chile—marking feminism’s entry into the political field of social movements. Their front and center slogan, “Against the Precariousness of Life,” has proven to be a central slogan used in the mobilizations that broke out since October 18th. Although feminism was invisibilized during the first weeks of the protests, in the days since feminists organized a presence at the marches, raising concrete demands. The feminist movement – of which the March 8th Feminist Coordinator has been a fundamental proponent – has developed a transversal struggle against the patriarchy, capitalism, and racism, highlighting the necessity for feminists to be present in all neighborhood assemblies, cabildos (neighborhood councils), and community onces (teatime). It has been feminists who denounced before anyone else the disappearences and the use of sexual violence as a torture mechanism against women during the demonstrations, replicating methods employed by the genocidal military dictatorships in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s.

“We see this current moment [in Chile] both as a popular reaction against neoliberal policies and an incipient regional anger and disillusionment with the left governments that formed the so-called “Pink Tide”, which came to power with popular support and hope, inspiring various sectors of the international left, but created more continuity than change.“

High school students – one of the most active groups in the demonstrations since the 2006 militant student mobilizations known as the Penguin Revolution – have suffered a year of extreme repression. There were widespread media images this year of the riot police attacking students at the National Institute (a prestigious all-male public school) in an attempt to implement policies of state control and repression inside the schools. The “Safe Classrooms” Law is an attempt to break the legacy of the student movement. The National Institute students, who have played an emblematic role in directing the student movement, were subjected to police violence, such as the expulsion of student leaders, and were criminalized by media outlets.

These same students organized the mass subway fare evasions on October 11th, jumping or breaking subway turnstiles to protest the 30 peso fare increase. Within days, their call to join the evasion movement grew in popular support. On Friday, October 18th, Piñera’s government responded with even more repression, transforming the peaceful act of evasion into a battle against the riot police. When city and government officials closed the entire Santiago subway system, forcing thousands of workers to pack crowded buses or walk home, the citizen response was not of frustration toward the students but solidarity. The people as a whole rose up to evade, fight against the police, and attack and loot in mass the businesses that created precarious conditions in Chile: Isapres (health insurers), AFP (pension funds administrators), ENEL (electricity distributor), large supermarkets and retail stores.

Given this scenario, the government strategy has been to increase their repressive strategies against protesters. On Friday, October 18th, President Sebastian Piñera declared a state of emergency that enabled the government to place military forces in the streets, and establish a military curfew for the Santiago area. The people, far from being intimidated, stood firm in the streets and defied the military curfew, by banging pots and kitchen utensils (“caseroleos”), building barricades, and attacking the military and the police with rocks or other things.

The widespread discontent reflects anger over years of neoliberal policies and state repression that the people have endured. There are 24 reported deaths, over 200 people have lost sight in an eye due to rubber bullets and pellets, and there are at least 52 complaints of sexual violence by the hands of the police or military since the protests began on October 18. The social movement slogans “No more AFP” and “End the Commodification of Education, Health, Housing, Transportation, and Natural Resources,” as well as the call to replace the 1980 Constitution drafted during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990), resonate at protests across the country. The governments’ 30-year indifference to popular demands underscore that the only way to end the neoliberal experiment is through a grassroots movement to transform society. Unfortunately, there is no peaceful way out. There is no solution to the conflict while the military is in the streets and a government deal is unacceptable while human rights abuses continue against working people.

Chile in Global Context

The oppressive situation imposed by the political and economic system in Chile, institutionalized by military dictatorship and continued by the Concertación (center-left) governments, is not an isolated case in either the region or the world. In Ecuador, Haiti, Lebanon, Catalonia, Hong Kong, and various other places, people are tired of abuses by the capitalist ruling class. Global protests call to stand up against the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as the states and rulers who execute their policies.

We must understand the popular uprising in Chile in that light. We see this current moment both as a popular reaction against neoliberal policies and an incipient regional anger and disillusionment with the left governments that formed the so-called “Pink Tide” (Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua), which came to power with popular support and hope, inspiring various sectors of the international left, but created more continuity than change–particularly after the 2008 economic crisis and the fall in commodity prices. Meanwhile, as authoritarianism and the right make advances in the region, we observe with remorse the recent coup d’etat in Bolivia and the brutal racist and class-based oppression against native and peasant communities. Finally, we must highlight the coup d’etat in Honduras in 2009, backed by the United States and driven by the Honduran oligarchy and army. Ten years of neoliberal policies has left Honduras in a major political crisis, leading the population to protest against repression, corruption and privatization in recent months.

In other parts of the world—with US and European complicity—a genocidal military campaign by the Turkish state is underway in Syria. Turkish military encroachment aims to reverse the liberated cantons’ community life and the socialist project led by the YPG, YPJ, and Kurdish people’s militias. In Catalonia, some weeks ago, masses took to the streets in support for self-determination, independence, and in repudiation of the judicial ruling that imprisons those who fight. We have also seen Ecuadorian indigenous people and workers organize a revolt that halted a state package of adjustments (Decree 883). In Haiti, the months-long protests led to the resignation of the president, something also achieved by Lebanese protesters in opposition to state corruption and government policies that seek to impose an economic burden on the shoulders of working people. In Hong Kong, protesters have been fighting for more than six months to prevent the passing of a Chinese extradition law. In New York, on November 2, a day of protests and subway fare evasions was organized in response to the high costs of living and racist police violence. NYC protesters used Negro Matapacos (cop killer black dog), a street dog who participated in student protests and a symbol of the struggles in Chile. As demonstrated, Chile is part of a worldwide network of struggles that are emerging against an unlivable system.

Class Struggle, Direct Action, and Attempts at New Forms of Organization

We are able to stand up against those who oppress us with mass support and through direct action. On Friday, October 25th, more than 2 million people marched throughout Chile and Wallmapu [1] calling on President Piñera to resign and in favor of a Popular Constituent Assembly. The Chilean people demonstrated that there is no need for a plebiscite because they already voted with their feet, bodies, and determination. The reaction by the right-wing government has been more repression and persecution and on November 7 a Public Order Plan was announced that intends to criminalize all forms of protests, which we reject.

But beyond the barricades and mass direct action there is another story. Through the destruction of hundreds of symbols of colonization in squares and towns something new is being woven. Throughout Chile, slowly but surely, hundreds of territorial assemblies, cabildos [local councils], and community onces [literally “teas,” small gathering like a coffee meet up] consolidating a new form of popular power. Historical forms of organization by the working class are being reinvigorated— once encased in our collective memory. We are building the foundations of a new movement engendered from rage and protest that is both constructive and widespread. To coordinate and plan successfully, we need to develop popular unity from below, which is our primary task at the moment.

An Urgent Task: Solidarity with the Chilean People’s Struggle

The Chilean working class is carving out a path of struggle against the ravages caused by the neoliberal project. The state has no solution and we cannot trust the regime’s political parties who make agreements among themselves and behind closed doors, and who are trying to promote a “Peace Agreement” and water down the potential of a popular constituent assembly. The agreement, which lacks broad representation, intends to buy Piñera time while refusing to address the immediate popular demands. The agreement does not include the demand for justice for human rights violations and state murders, and offers only superficial changes designed to distract and demobilize.

The current tasks, agenda, and emancipatory perspective must be those visions and demands put forward by working people in the streets, workplaces, schools and universities. Organizing and supporting the growth of popular neighborhood assemblies independent from political parties allows the grassroots blossoming of debates to initiate and build a program of demands in the short, medium, and long-term.

We call on comrades abroad to support the struggles of the Chilean working people by participating in local protests and assemblies or cabildos and promoting events or talks about the political situation in Chile, Latin America, and the world. The Chilean struggle against neoliberalism is a struggle that resonates throughout the globe. If the Chilean people achieve their demands, it will be an example for social movements internationally. As the Santiago street graffiti exclaims: Neoliberalism was born and will die in Chile!

SOLIDARITY WITH THE CHILEAN PEOPLE RISING AND FIGHTING!
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND COORDINATION OF TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLIES THAT DEBATE FOR THE CREATION OF A TRUE PLURINATIONAL AND FEMINIST POPULAR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY!
FOR SOCIALISM AND FREEDOM!
¡ARRIBA LXS QUE LUCHAN!

Solidaridad (Chile)
Acción Socialista Libertaria – ASL (Argentina)
Black Rose / Rosa Negra Anarchist Federation – BRRN (United States)

Endnotes

1. Wallmapu is the name for the ancestral territory of the Mapuche people and nation, located in southern Chile and Argentina.

If you enjoyed this piece and are interested in learning more about Latin American anarchism we recommend our three-part series in English and Spanish “Libertarian Socialism in Latin America”: Part I – Chile, Part II – Argentina, Part III – Brazil.

Πρέπει να συνεχίσουμε τις κινητοποιήσεις και να ενδυναμώσουμε τις οργανώσεις της τάξης μας, τις τοπικές συνελεύσεις, τις οργανώσεις για τα δικαιώματα των γυναικών, τα έμφυλα και φεμινιστικά παραβατικά υποκείμενα, τις συνελεύσεις, τους συντονισμούς της υπεράσπισης της γης και του νερού, τις οργανώσεις των αυτόχθονων πληθυσμών και να ενισχυθεί ο πρωταγωνιστικός ρόλος του λαού στα συνδικάτα, τις ομοσπονδίες και τα μαθητικά κέντρα.

Τέταρτη ανακοίνωση της Αναρχικής Ομοσπονδίας του Σαντιάγο για τις κοινωνικές εξεγέρσεις στη χώρα

Ένας μήνας έχει περάσει από τότε που οι άνθρωποι που ζουν στην περιοχή που ορίζεται ως «Χιλιανό κράτος» ξεσηκώθηκαν και αγωνίστηκαν με αξιοπρέπεια ενάντια στις ευτελιστικές και επισφαλείς συνθήκες που τους επέβαλε η αστική τάξη, συνθήκες που αντιμετωπίστηκαν με μία κοινωνική έκρηξη, ο απόηχος της οποίας παραμένει αισθητός μέχρι σήμερα.

Η θέληση της καταπιεζόμενης τάξης παραμένει ακλόνητη, μέρα με τη μέρα, βδομάδα με τη βδομάδα. Η αντίσταση και η αυτοοργανωση ειναι εμφανή παντού στις πλατείες, στις γειτονιές, στους δρομους.

Οι κινητοποιήσεις συνεχίζονται παρά την προδοσία των συνήθων οπορτουνιστών, που κάθισαν ξανά στο τραπέζι της μπουρζουαζίας για να κάνουν συμφωνίες που αφορουν τις ζωές μας. Οι άνθρωποι έδειξαν σε αυτά τα παράσιτα πως είναι αχρείαστοι, πως ο αγώνας συνεχίζεται παρά το πισώπλατο χτύπημα τους και πως η αντίσταση είναι ακυβέρνητη και θα συνεχίσει για όσο υπάρχει το κεφαλαιο και η πατριαρχία.

Η καταστολή από το κράτος και τους λακέδες του εχει αποβεί αιματηρή.

Η κρατική τρομοκρατία έχει εφαρμοστεί με ολοκληρωτική ατιμωρησία και με τη συνενοχή διαφόρων θεσμών, που είναι και ο λόγος πίσω από τους διαρκώς αυξανόμενους αριθμούς: μέχρι σήμερα, περισσότεροι από 6000 άνθρωποι έχουν συλληφθεί, 222 άνθρωποι έχασαν τα μάτια τους από την καταστολή, 30 άνθρωποι έχασαν τη ζωή τους, περισσότεροι από 2400 τραυματίστηκαν, εκατοντάδες υπέστησαν βασανιστήρια και φυλακίστηκαν και δεκάδες άνθρωποι έχουν γίνει θύματα βιασμού, επιβεβαιώνοντας πως η κατάσταση εκτάκτου ανάγκης έχει μονιμοποιηθεί και ότι η πολιτική του πολέμου ενάντια στις καταπιεζόμενες τάξεις είναι το καλύτερο μάθημα που διδάχτηκε στο «Escuela de las Américas». Ακόμα, έχει ξεκινήσει η ποινικοποίηση των ανθρώπων που συνεχίζουν να αντιστέκονται στους δρόμους και η στοχοποίησή τους με εφόδους, ψευδή στοιχεία και κατηγορίες με βάση τον πινοσετικό αντιτρομοκρατικό νόμο περί ασφάλειας της χώρας.

Το κυνήγι μαγισσών ξεκίνησε και το κράτος ετοιμάζεται να εκτονώσει την επιθετικότητά του. Απόδειξη γι' αυτό είναι πως η κυβέρνηση ανακοινώνει μία σειρά από νόμους που στοχεύουν άμεσα στην καταστολή των κοινωνικών αγώνων. Ένα σημαντικό στοιχείο αποτελεί και ο ρόλος των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων. Αυτός ήταν εκτελεστικός με την έννοια ότι έπαιρναν αποφάσεις αυτόνομα τις τελευταίες εβδομάδες. Αυτό φαίνεται στο γεγονός ότι την Τρίτη, 12 Νοεμβρίου, στο πλαίσιο της μαζικής απεργίας που εξαπλώθηκε σε όλες τις περιοχές, η κυβέρνηση, με την ουρά ανάμεσα στα πόδια της, σε μία συνάντηση στην La Moneda ζητά για ακόμα μία φορά βοήθεια από τις ένοπλες δυνάμεις, στις κατασταλτικές δράσεις ενάντια στην τάξη μας. Όμως οι ένοπλες δυνάμεις ζήτησαν να τους δοθεί εγγύηση ατιμωρησίας για τα εγκληματα ενάντια στην ανθρωπότητα που είναι έτοιμοι να διαπράξουν ενάντια στους αγωνιζόμενους ανθρώπους. Αντιμέτωποι με τον φόβο της πολιτικής ευθύνης που συνεπάγεται κάτι τέτοιο, η κυβέρνηση αποφάσισε να μην παρέχει ατιμωρησία στις ένοπλες δυνάμεις, οι οποίες τελικά δε βγήκαν στο δρόμο, αφήνοντας τον Πινιέρα και το γελοίο συνάφι του να καλέσει συνταξιούχους αστυνομικούς για να συνεργαστούν μαζι τους στα κατασταλτικά τους σχέδια.

Όχι μονο αυτό δεν φάνηκε αστείο σ' εμάς αλλα το θεωρούμε ακραία ανησυχητικό, όταν βλέπουμε τις ένοπλες δυνάμεις να λαμβάνουν αποφάσεις αυτόνομα, με το πολιτικό τους εγχείρημα να σχετίζεται με τον παρόν σενάριο, ένα εγχείρημα που αποπειράται να εντοπίσει την ανικανότητα της παρούσας πολιτικής κάστας να επιβάλει την τάξη στο πρόσωπο της κοινωνικής έκρηξης, ξεκινώντας από μία πολιτική λύση και φτάνοντας στην βίαιη επέμβαση για την επαναφορά της τάξης με χρήση των όπλων και του εξεφτελισμού των ανθρώπων.

Καλούμε όλες τις κοινότητες του αγώνα να είναι σε επαγρύπνιση για την πιθανότητα επιστροφής της στρατιωτικής τρομοκρατίας στους δρόμους, αλλά αυτή τη φορά με μία πιο ριζοσπαστική επέμβαση.

Η σάπια πολιτική κάστα του πρώην εθνικού κογκρέσου προέβη σε διάφορα διαβήματα προς την επίτευξη πολιτικών συμφωνιών για να προχωρήσει σε ένα νέο σύνταγμα. Τα κόμματα του κατεστημένου, από αριστερά μέχρι δεξιά, έδωσαν τα χέρια σε ένα διήμερο διαπραγματεύσεων στο πρόσωπο της πιθανότητας μίας στρατιωτικής επέμβασης που θα έδινε μία γρήγορη πολιτική λύση στην κρίση.

Από τα δωμάτια της χλιδής γεννήθηκε η γνωστή «Συμφωνία για την Κοινωνική Ειρήνη και το Σύνταγμα», ενώ οι κοινότητες του αγώνα τιμούσαν τη μνήμη του Camilo Catrillanca που πέθανε στα χέρια του κράτους πριν από ένα χρόνο στο Wallmapu. Από τα παράθυρα του παλατιού έβγαινε καπνός, που αποσκοπούσε να θολώσει την όψη της καταπιεζόμενης τάξης, με μία συμφωνία που έχει πάνω της κηλίδες από το αίμα των νεκρών μας, των φυλακισμένων, των βασανισμένων, των βιασμένων και των κατακρεουργημένων σωμάτων των αγωνιστών μας. Προσπάθησαν να φιμώσουν την άσβηστη αντίσταση των ανθρώπων του αγώνα, προσπάθησαν να κάνουν μία συμφωνία στο όνομα αυτών που αντιστέκονται, χωρίς την παραμικρή αντιπροσώπευση των συμφερόντων των καταπιεσμένων.

Η συμφωνία τους για ένα νέο σύνταγμα δεν είναι κάτι περισσότερο από αυτό που έχουμε ήδη καταδικάσει στην προηγούμενη επιστολή μας, ως ένα μέσο να δώσει οξυγόνο σε μία σταγόνα δημοκρατίας για να μπορέσουν να τεθούν τα θεμέλια για ένα νέο κράτος που θα συνεχίσει να εκπληρώνει τον ιστορικό ρόλο της καταπίεσης των κοινοτήτων που παλεύουν ενάντια στην αστική τάξη και το σύστημα που της επιτρέπει να κυριαρχεί.

Όποιος κι αν ειναι ο μηχανισμός που θα χρησιμοποιηθεί να αλλάξει το σύνταγμα, αυτός απλά αναδομεί το κράτος, το ζήτημα όμως δεν είναι αυτό της συμμετοχικότητας αλλά αυτό της ταξικής πραγματικότητας. Αυτή η διαδικασία συμβάλλει υποστηρικτικά προς την αστική τάξη η οποία έχει διαβρωθεί από την πινοσετική της κληρονομιά και μέσω αυτών των ανακοινώσεων προσπαθεί να αναγεννήσει μία νέα κοινωνική συμφωνία βασισμένη σε μία παραπλανητική συμμετοχή των πολιτών, η οποία εξυπηρετεί ως «μάρτυρας πίστεως» στη διαδικασία αναδόμησης του αστικου συνταγματικού πλαισίου.

Έπειτα από ένα μήνα αγώνα, έχουμε κερδίσει πολλά, έχουμε αναπροσδιορίσει τους εαυτούς μας ως μέλη μίας τάξης καταπιεσμένων, ως ο κοινωνικός ιστός που εξαλείφθηκε τα αιματηρά χρόνια του Πινοσέτ κι έχει ξαναγεννηθεί, έχουμε ανακαλύψει ένα κομμάτι των ζωών μας. Όμως, η επισφάλεια της καθημερινότητας παραμένει άθικτη, γι αυτό έχει τεράστια σημασία να συνεχίσουμε τις κινητοποιήσεις για να έχουμε κάποια αποτελέσματα σύντομα, τα οποία θα ανεβάσουν το ηθικό στον κόσμο του αγώνα, επιτρέποντάς του να ζήσει σε πιο αξιοπρεπείς συνθήκες. Γι΄ αυτό είναι σημαντικό να συνεχίσουμε να παλεύουμε για να παραλύσουμε την κυβερνητική νομοθετική ατζέντα, στην οποία εμπεριέχονται το TPP-11, ο νόμος κοινωνικής ενσωμάτωσης και η κατασταλτική ατζέντα που πρεπει να καταργηθούν άμεσα. Από την άλλη, παλεύουμε για επαναφορά των κοινωνικών δικαιωμάτων, μέσω της κατάργησης του AFP, την απόσυρση του νόμου για το νερό, την διαγραφή του εκπαιδευτικού χρέους, φρένο στη μόνιμη μείωση βασικών υπηρεσιών, την μείωση των εργασιακών ωραρίων και την αύξηση του βασικού μισθού.

Στεκόμαστε αλληλέγγυοι με τους συντρόφους μας που έχουν υποφέρει από την σκληρή καταστολή, ιδιαίτερα αυτούς που τώρα βρίσκονται φυλακισμένοι αντιμετωπίζοντας σύνθετες κατασταλτικές διαδικασίες με την εφαρμογή των πιο τομακτικών νόμων της αστικής τάξης. Τέλος καλούμε τον κόσμο του αγώνα να μην παρασυρθεί από τα κόπλα των κομμάτων που θέλουν να διατηρήσουν την τάξη, να μην διαπραγματευτεί με τους δολοφόνους και να μην πιστέψει την ψεύτικη ειρήνη τους. Πρέπει να συνεχίσουμε τις κινητοποιήσεις και να ενδυναμώσουμε τις οργανώσεις της τάξης μας, τις τοπικές συνελεύσεις, τις οργανώσεις για τα δικαιώματα των γυναικών, τα έμφυλα και φεμινιστικά παραβατικά υποκείμενα, τις συνελεύσεις, τους συντονισμούς της υπεράσπισης της γης και του νερού, τις οργανώσεις των αυτόχθονων πληθυσμών και να ενισχυθεί ο πρωταγωνιστικός ρόλος του λαού στα συνδικάτα, τις ομοσπονδίες και τα μαθητικά κέντρα.

Ας πολλαπλασιαστεί και θωρακιστεί η αντίσταση με οργανωτικά που θα οδηγήσουν στην απελευθέρωσή μας!

Ας συνεχίσουμε τον αγώνα!

Για να χτίσουμε μία οργανωμένη κοινότητα! Να ριζώσει ο αναρχισμός!

Να φτιάξουμε οργανωμένες αυτόνομες κοινότητες!

Ζήτω οι αγώνες των λαών!

Άμεση απελευθέρωση των κρατουμένων της κοινωνικής επανάστασης!

Αναρχική Ομοσπονδία Σαντιάγο

19 Νοεμβρίου 2019

Σχετικός σύνδεσμος: https://enoughisenough14.org/2019/11/20/fourth-statement-by-the-federacion-anarquista-santiago-on-the-social-uprising-in-chile/

Μετάφραση: το μαύρο berry.

Regarding recent events in Bolivia, some things are simple: Was it a coup? Yes. On Sunday, November 10, the commander-in-chief of Bolivia’s armed forces, General Williams Kaliman, publicly told Evo Morales, a constitutionally elected president, that he ought to resign for the good of the country. There is no other name for this kind of thing. Even if Evo had been officially accused of legal wrongdoing – he had not – this procedure of removal is unconstitutional. The resignation took place under an unstated threat of violence. Bolivia’s history gives reason to take this threat seriously: military coups and counter-coups were a decisive feature of political life throughout the twentieth century. And considering that the police, two days before the general’s intervention, had already decided to allow anti-government protestors to commit violence against the homes and family-members of supporters of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, to which Evo belongs, Kaliman’s remarks carried weight well beyond a “suggestion.”

Should people with a preference for emancipatory politics support the coup or oppose it? This, too, is simple: we can only be against it. The meaning of this, in practice, depends on one’s position. Given that I’m a US citizen living thousands of miles from La Paz, I venture my opposition should focus on the US role. Whether material or ideological, any support for the coup by the US state is hypocritical, destructive, and all too familiar. The most important thing I can do, I think, is to call on the government that supposedly represents me to stop supporting this coup – in addition to the sanctions, bombings, crop eradications, mobilizations, counter-insurgency operations, and every other disgusting imperialist act. If I cannot make this denunciation heard on my own, I should organize to amplify it.

In referencing the concrete activity of organization, however, we move from definition and position-taking to the level of politics. Here, simplicity gives way to murkiness. Much more difficult than to ask whether this was a coup or whether one should support coups are the questions: How did this coup happen? What conditions made it possible?

Compare the conditions for this coup to the one against socialist Chilean President Salvador Allende, deposed and likely murdered by CIA-trained military operatives in 1973. His coalition had held executive office for only three years, facing a congress controlled by the opposition. It had been elected by a plurality and faced open hostility from capitalists within the country, from the military, and from the rest of the capitalist world – including, of course, the world’s largest superpower, the United States. These factions organized to undermine him and create crisis conditions for nearly the entirety of his presidency. Chile was deep in a capital-induced economic spiral when the military made its decisive and violent intervention.

The MAS under Evo Morales and Alvaro García Linera, on the other hand, was the most successful political force in Bolivia in decades. Starting out as the “political instrument” of coca-growers unions in the country’s Chapare region in the late 1990s, it rose to national prominence throughout the mass political insurgencies against neoliberalism from 2000 to 2005, when Evo was first elected. He won that election with an outright majority – a first since the return to civilian rule in 1982 – and has done so in two more scheduled presidential elections since, in addition to a recall vote, each with nearly a supermajority. The MAS is the only party that has been able to compete consistently in national elections for the last fourteen years, and it has continuously controlled at least one (often both) of its legislatures. Evo has led the greatest period of economic growth and political stability that the country has ever seen, even while other Latin American economies have stumbled with falling commodity prices. As even critics have noted, his mandate has resulted in massive social welfare gains in healthcare, equality, poverty-reduction, and literacy; it has also given voice to the masses of indigenous and campesino people in Bolivia who had been the object of discrimination and exclusion for more than four centuries.

Crisis
To understand the coup, then, we have to understand the political crisis in which this seemingly solid ground fell out from under Evo and the MAS. The coup was an attempt by some class fractions in Bolivia to put an end to the crisis at the expense of the MAS. The MAS lacked the strength to resist this outcome. If we fail to understand why, no amount of posturing will prevent this from happening again, either in Bolivia or in another situation in which a polarizing champion of radical change might win an election against the wishes of the ruling class. For those distant from Bolivia, this sort of analysis is key to strategizing for internationalist solidarity.

How did a crisis emerge to which a coup seemed like the best option in the eyes of a military, which had, for better or worse, a largely positive relationship with the MAS-controlled portions of the state?[1] Why did at least some portion of the population that originally supported Evo, or only wanted to see a second round of voting in the election, end up demanding his ouster? And why did some powerful sectors that had, in fact, benefitted from the relative social stability ushered in by the MAS decide it was time to change course by any means necessary?

Most immediately the crisis began with the elections on October 20. In this election, the winner would need to defeat his or her nearest opponent by ten percent, or else face a runoff. Polls showed Evo beating his nearest opponent Carlos Mesa – a former president who had in fact been deposed by protests in 2005 – by something close to this amount. After a portion of the votes had been counted indicating that Evo’s lead would be right around ten percent, there was a one-day break in the poll counting. According to an analysis by the Center for Economic and Policy Research, this procedure was entirely normal. When the count resumed, Evo’s lead over Mesa widened slightly, which was also predictable given the geographic distribution of which vote tallies had been counted and which had not. Mesa, however, already declared that he knew there would be a runoff, and so when the count resumed and official results came in showing Evo winning by just over ten percent, he demanded a new election and was echoed by various segments of the national and international media, by international organizations like the EU and the US-dominated Organization of American States (OAS), and by the rightwing forces whose power, for the most part, was situated in regional governments and civic committees.

So a seemingly predictable outcome in a close race suddenly became a basis for some to declare electoral fraud. Some people who took to the streets were, of course, opposed to Evo and the MAS in general, and others may have resented that Evo was running despite losing a 2016 referendum to abolish term-limits, which the country’s electoral court subsequently found violated Evo’s rights. The OAS, a United States-sponsored body and no close friend to Latin America’s leftists like Evo, volunteered to investigate the fraud claims, and Evo – but not Mesa – agreed to abide by their findings.

While the investigation proceeded, protests grew. The leader who urged them on and who pushed them toward demands for resignation, rather than a re-vote and regardless of what the OAS found, was Luis Fernando Camacho. Member of an élite family, Camacho is involved in financial and legal consulting – including, as revealed in the Panama Papers, helping private businesses set up tax-dodging offshore accounts. He has never held elected office, but was once a leader of a right-wing regional youth organization, the Union Juvenil Cruceña (UJC), from 2002 to 2004. Recently, however, he has occupied an influential position as the president of the Pro-Santa Cruz Civic Committee, a business association in Bolivia’s second-largest city, seat of the most recalcitrant and racist opposition to the MAS in the early years of its government, when the UJC served as its “brass knuckles” by attacking indigenous people who supported Evo. As a protest leader Camacho eventually outflanked Mesa; the latter continued to call for a new election rather than simply demanding that Evo resign immediately.

Over the last several weeks, supporters of Evo and the MAS have been marching too. And though the New York Times and other English-language media outlets have painted the MAS supporters as “armed bands” terrorizing the innocent anti-MAS protestors, it is more accurate to say that a two-sided political conflict resulted in two-sided political violence. Since no one disputes that Evo won a plurality of the votes, it’s unsurprising that the anti-MAS protests were met with counter-protests.

On Friday, November 8, the police, who have not had a strong relationship with Evo, declared that they would not police the protests anymore. Sunday, the OAS issued its report citing “irregularities” – not fraud – in the election, pointing to but not providing evidence of several instances of questionable paper vote tallies and some lack of technical accountability in the electronic processing of an unofficial vote count.[2] It was no smoking gun, but it was enough for Evo to agree to a new vote. Yet shortly thereafter, the military – whom Evo never called on to police the protests – then “suggested” that he resign for the good of the country. Hence, the coup.

Contradictions
The immediate political crisis and the coup, however, are also rooted in a deeper history of the vicissitudes of the MAS itself.

The key is the significant loss of broad, mobilized, popular participation that won the famous Cochabamba Water War against water privatization in 2000, that deposed two neoliberal presidents in 2003 and 2005 (the latter being Mesa), that elected Evo Morales as the first indigenous president in 2005 and brought the MAS to power, that pushed for a new constitution enshrining indigenous rights, that allowed a vast renegotiation of Bolivia’s relationship to transnational energy companies, and that overcame the worst of the Santa Cruz secession crisis of 2008. The organizational core of this support were rurally-based indigenous organizations like the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB), the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), and the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), but at decisive points in each of these struggles they were joined by labour unions, urban neighborhood federations, student groups, civic organizations, and others. The combined power of these groups engaging in strikes, highway blockades, and protests brought the country to a standstill on more than one occasion. Within these ranks, Evo still has plenty of supporters, and in some parts of the country they are mobilizing to oppose self-proclaimed President Jeanine Añez’s transitional government. There have been several mass marches from the largely indigenous city of El Alto into La Paz, and highway blockades here and there in the countryside, but the kind of hegemony that the party enjoyed at its high points, and that enabled it to push through each of those decisive moments, is now fractured. Even in El Alto, some neighborhood committees have opted out of the protests.

The MAS has embodied contradictions since it emerged on the national scene. Its mass base is indigenous, and in coming to power it redefined indigenous identity, but it did so through a joining of this identity with a broader, more traditional nationalism that motivated some of the large protests in the early 2000s – a nationalism that had historically been built upon the exclusion of the indigenous masses. The state’s embrace of “plurinationality,” enshrined in the 2009 constitution, has thus often contrasted with its impulse to consolidate state power and appeal to powerful social sectors on the basis of a more classical nationalist ideology. The MAS was a grassroots political party linked to specific grievances of Aymara coca growers against the state and the US Drug Enforcement Administration, but upon taking national proportions, its umbrella began to include other social movements, different indigenous groups, and opportunistic politicians who saw which way the wind was blowing. In turning its focus definitely to elections, the movements lost decision-making power in favor of a looser consultative role. On the international scene, the Plurinational State of Bolivia has been a voice for a radical rethinking of human responsibility toward the non-human environment, while its economy has nonetheless continued to subsist on fossil fuel extraction, and the state has pursued environmentally destructive development projects in the face of protests.

There is a strong argument to be made that these broad contradictions are simply the result of historical conditions beyond the MAS’s or any movement’s choosing. That is, they were largely the result of an international situation that would never be friendly to a small country like Bolivia’s attempt to shake off, at least to a certain degree, the Washington Consensus. The approach to development it pursued, the compromises it made with foreign capital, have been the basis for its large improvements in social welfare, which in turn should allow it to hold onto its role at the helm of a power bloc, that is, an articulated formation of social sectors with the ability to exercise power as a collective political agent. In setting a new course for the country – with things like participatory community decision making about infrastructure projects, the development of new school curricula that reflect critically on the history of colonialism, the creation of novel political forms of local autonomy – one could imagine that people would become better organized to defend the process of change underway. And perhaps most broadly, one could imagine that the national accumulation of capital in a capitalist world might help Bolivia delink from the global centers of capital and get some political and economic breathing room.

Why didn’t this happen then? Why did the bloc in power now fall apart?

Some analysts have focused on the constitutional referendum of 2016, suggesting that Evo and Garcia Linera’s attempt to change the constitution to allow them a fourth term was illegal or somehow wrong. The MAS lost the referendum, and Evo brought his case to the country’s highest court, which cited the American Convention on Human Rights to rule that all term limits are a violation of one’s political rights. If this raises liberal hackles, it shouldn’t; the court played its constitutionally defined role and made a juridical judgment in accordance with its interpretation of an international convention of which Bolivia is a signatory. Furthermore, the court is actually an elected body in Bolivia, subject to democratic oversight in a way that, say, the US Supreme court is not.

But the MAS’s effort to get Evo on the ballot again for the 2019 vote does raise other issues, of political rather than legal provenance. In the first place, the MAS at its high points of popularity relied on votes from the progressive portions of the urban middle classes; some of these were offended by the 2016 referendum and aftermath, however, and now largely lost to the MAS. Perhaps more importantly: how did the MAS reach a point where it understood its only electoral chance in a presidential election to hinge on Evo as a candidate? That the process of change became essentially dependent on a single figure owed in part to its loss of dynamism as the party became a distinct entity from the social movements whose political instrument it once was. Identification with Evo as a symbolic figure, while not without reason, began to stand in for an organic process that would have deepened the MAS’s hegemony through a constant process of organizing, mobilizing, and participating. Grassroots organizations that once steered the MAS ended up being steered by a layer of political leaders and party functionaries.

How might it have been different? Some of the events that speak to this breach – and eventually, antagonism – between the MAS and portions of its organizational and popular base have recently circulated in articles by Raul Zibechi and Raquel Gutierrez Aguilar. These commentaries are shortsighted and politically inopportune insofar as they equivocate about whether a coup has taken place and draw false equivalences between the MAS and the far-right. But in a sense Zibechi is correct to say that the bleak situation of the past week “began with systematic attacks by the government of Evo Morales and Álvaro García Linera against the same popular movements that brought them to power, to the point that when they needed the movements to defend them, the movements were deactivated and demoralized.” The MAS hemorrhaged its urban, middle-class supporters who were swayed by inaccurate claims of fraud or charges of personal authoritarianism against Evo, but the indigenous, campesino, and labour organizations that failed to materialize in the party’s defense during the coup were a casualty of earlier conflicts.

The party came to power in part through the flourishing of rural indigenous organizations like the CIDOB, the CSUTCB, and the CONAMAQ. These organizations and several others, working together as the Pacto de Unidad, sought to put forth amendments directly to the constituent assembly during the rewriting of the constitution from 2006 to 2008. They proposed radical participatory measures for the Plurinational State, including the right to the immediate recall of legislators, the institutionalization of communal assemblies as a governing form, and recognition of indigenous methods of delegation. The opposition parties didn’t want to entertain these proposals during the assembly, and the MAS did not prioritize them. Instead, the Movimiento al Socialismo called for a referendum on Evo to push the conflictual writing process along, knowing that his symbolic status would assemble the voters needed to give the party the mandate it needed to break through the intransigence of the opposition. The strategy worked, but the autonomous movement organizations never had a chance to introduce their radical proposals, and the relationship between them and the MAS was weakened.

In 2011, the state sought to build a massive highway through a large ecological reserve and autonomous indigenous territory, the TIPNIS. When the people who lived there marched to La Paz to voice their opposition, the police and the air force intercepted them. Thanks to the solidarity of other campesinos during these confrontations, arrested march leaders were freed, and the air force’s planes – presumably there to carry away the arrested marchers – were not able to land. The march grew and made it to La Paz; their arrival was greeted by massive demonstrations against police repression. Later on, however, the MAS organized its own group of pro-highway counter-protestors in the TIPNIS, and held an official consultation that many residents claimed excluded highway opponents. The Pacto de Unidad fell apart, as did several member organizations when the MASistas in them attempted to split from those who wouldn’t toe the line. This strategy of parellelism, creating duplicate, MAS-aligned organizations, known as oficialista as opposed to the autonomous orgánica factions, would be used repeatedly. As Zibechi points out, It often included using the police to dislodge the orgánica factions from organizational offices.[3]

One might call these contradictions among the people. That is, given the needs of the Bolivian state to prevent a full-blown crisis during the constitutional re-write, and to effectively update transportation infrastructure in order to develop its own industrial base, one might argue that these political differences were unavoidable. They can be seen as part of the contradictory reality brought on by trying to act effectively in the context of international capitalism and the imperialist organization of the global state system. And if the MAS had treated them as such, that may have been the case, but on the contrary, the party did not hesitate to push out its grassroots flank whenever it seemed useful to do so, sometimes deliberately sowing conflict, and at other times meeting people with undue repression. Exercising a durable hegemony would have meant educating, conversing, compromising, trying all efforts to overcome the contradiction rather than letting it result in antagonism. This is no doubt easier said than done, yet the importance should be clear: the MAS are now lost without the power of these groups.

And if the contradictions between the MAS and its mass base were contradictions among the people, the primary, antagonistic conflicts should have been with capital. Yet the MAS had congenial, mutually beneficial relationships with large transnational and national fractions of capital involved in the gas and oil extraction industries, as well as Brazilian capital (who would have benefited greatly from the TIPNIS highway), and the local agrarian capitalist élite in the eastern portion of the country. Ironically, while the MAS held fast to these relationships – for all the good it did them this past week – Evo and García Linera accused dissenters on their left, including indigenous organizations who disagreed with them, research organizations studying the environmental toll of development plans, and workers who demanded increased wages, of being tools of foreign powers. The real contradiction was displaced in the wrong direction.

Hence, some of these organizations joined the protests, calling first for a new vote and then for Evo’s resignation. Obviously, the rise of the right is dangerous for them, yet who can blame them for thinking that the MAS-led state was their principal political adversary when the state has treated them as such for the last seven years? Their participation in the post-election protests was small compared to the “mass centrist protest by urban middle classes” that they joined. The latter were concerned with Evo’s long mandate as both a matter of abstract liberal principle and in part because they realized that the MAS’s ongoing power would mean their ongoing exclusion from the spoils of state power. And while the process of change was producing new indigenous middle classes who turned out to be ambivalent when it came to the conflict, the old ones were still around, now feeling that Evo was no longer the “democratic” option – or the option by which they, in any case, could advance their interests. On top of this were regional civic movements like the one in Potosí, which has chafed recently in its relationship with the national government, demanding more autonomy in its budgeting and its ability to negotiate concessions for the extensive lithium reserves to be mined there.[4] The civic committee of Santa Cruz is the traditional bastion of opposition to Bolivia’s indigenous majority and home to its most virulent ultra-right, and now Christian fundamentalist political strains. These strains took on an outsize articulating role through the initiative of Camacho. Finally, seeing that the movement would not abate and trying to get out ahead of it, even leaders the Centro Obrero Boliviano (COB), the country’s national union federation with a well-deserved reputation for its part in bringing down military dictatorships, called on Evo to resign in order to end the conflict. But it was Kaliman’s word who tipped the scales.

Conclusions
The MAS, despite its political advantages, crumbled. Under threat, its officials resigned by the dozen with Evo and García Linera, including numerous mayors and local functionaries across the country, as well as the presidents of both chambers of congress. This cleared the way for Jeanine Añez in the line of succession. While those who remain may well participate in the next elections, the balance of power has shifted. The MAS has held an exceptional political position, and its electoral machine, as well as the symbolic weight of Evo and its management of the economy, were all factors in its favor. But its once great strength has come apart.

If a strong coalition of the MAS and other autonomous grassroots forces is difficult – owing, in part, to the MAS’s inflexibility and its tactics when dealing with contradictions among the people – the newly emboldened right, which took the initiative in the crisis, may make further gains. In contrast to their stated goal of simply organizing new elections, the coup ministers of Añez have already begun an audit of the state healthcare system. They’ve also withdrawn from ALBA, a regional body formed to counter US imperialism. Meanwhile, while police and soldiers killed at least nine protesters on Friday who were marching in support of Evo near Cochabamba, Añez’s office issued a decree releasing soldiers from criminal responsibility. To confront this situation, it’s still possible that some movements who’ve been crowded out by the MAS will resurface, but these are fewer than they once were, and, as even García Linera acknowledges, their demobilization means they may lack the requisite organizational experience.

A coup it is, as the outcome of a larger crisis. On some level, what has re-emerged in Bolivia are a series of contradictions that the MAS managed to navigate effectively for a time – regional, racial, sectoral, and institutional conflicts temporarily held at bay. How will the intervening hegemony of the MAS alter the new landscape? How will the new constitution? Will conditions allow Evo and García Linera stage a return? I won’t guess. But there’s something discouraging in how familiar the players are: the Pro-Santa Cruz civic committee, open anti-indianismo, Carlos Mesa, the OAS. The return of each onto the scene suggests the MAS’s break with the past was not as decisive as it once appeared.

Sadly for those who appreciate simplicity, contradictions are endemic. They’re all Bolivia has, and, in this world, all any of us can expect. Politics means navigating them, treating some as real antagonisms and others as challenges to be resolved with novel practices. If this space of contradiction is where political possibility emerges, then it’s also where stress builds up, ready to tear us apart. This isn’t to say that overcoming political contradictions is easy – but, in the end, repressing them isn’t any easier.

Endnotes
1. In fact, several months prior to the elections, some in the legislative opposition party of self-declared president Jeanine Añez attempted to have Kalimann removed from his position for alleged failure to comply with his constitutional role.
2. The report of the OAS auditors is available here. The report of the Center for Economic Policy and Research (CEPR) is comprehensive in its critical analysis of the OAS report, and its authors appear to possess a far greater understanding of the vote-tallying process than those of the OAS report. The OAS authors, for instance, never distinguish between the informal quick count, which was the count that ended after 80% of the votes were counted, and the official vote count. The OAS authors also baselessly claim that the final tally was statistically improbable based on the quick count, but the CEPR authors demonstrate that the outcome was in fact predictable.
3. For more details on the constituent assembly and TIPNIS protests, as well as further reading, see my essay “Turning the Tide: Revolutionary Potential and Bolivia’s ‘Process of Change’,” in Socialist Register 2017, eds. Greg Albo and Leo Pantich, London: Merlin Press, 2016.
4.While some have argued that access to lithium should play a central role in any analysis of the coup, the political articulation of this is complicated by its articulation with national debates about federalism and regional autonomy. What is in question in the conflict between the Plurinational State and the civic committee of Potosi as regards lithium is a specific contract by which the Bolivian national mining company would form a public-private partnership with a German firm, ACI Systems, to mine the lithium and develop infrastructure for processing it. The state sought out and defends this partnership, while the Potosi civic committee, which supported the anti-MAS protests, wanted it scrapped so that the profits from extraction would stay within the department. Morales annulled the partnership on November 4, presumably to try and diffuse some of the opposition coming out of Potosí after the election, though the conflict had been going on for almost a year. It is hard to draw any conclusions about whether Western capitalists as a whole would prefer dealing with one of these parties over the other. Certainly, however, the current political uncertainty may yet offer capitalists of all countries a chance to seek new terms for their involvement in the Bolivian economy.

A inicios del siglo XX el chivo expiatorio eran los anarquistas y los comunistas, “come niños y adoradores del diablo”, hoy son los correístas. A nadie le sirve desenmarcarse del correísmo para escapar a la persecución, vienen por todos los “sospechosos”. De todas formas, en este momento, como dijo un amigo días atrás “si no eres correísta te hacen, no hay de otra”.

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Martes 19 de noviembre de 2019, 21H00 o 22H00, suena fuertemente la puerta de madera. Desde la ventana de mi habitación alcanzo a observar la calle, un policía de operaciones especiales con armamento de guerra y otro vestido de civil, me hacen señas. No tengo idea si es para que les abra la puerta, o están alertando al equipo que se encontraba apostado en la puerta para que actúe.

Mi reacción, vestirme de inmediato. Pantalón jean, medias y zapatillas, calzo apenas una. Segundos antes un fuerte estruendo, habían abierto la puerta de un solo golpe. Trato de alertar a mi hermana menor, quiero calmarla, mis gritos no alcanzan a ser escuchados.

Los dos policías que vi momentos antes, ahora ingresaban a mi cuarto con sus armas de dotación en signo amenazante. “El celular, el celular, dame el celular” grita uno. Entre el miedo y la confusión no alcanzo a reaccionar. Inmediatamente aparece el oficial que dirigía la “operación”, insiste, me siento reducido a la nada y espero lo peor. Preguntan por la existencia de armas, “¿qué armas?”.

Miro los ojos de uno de ellos – es lo que alcanzo a ver - calculo menos de 30 años, “morocho”. Percibo miedo e ira, supongo su formación les hacía pensar que se iban a encontrar con un subversivo o terrorista, ¿qué imagen les habrán inculcado?

“Aseguren el lugar”, hacen su aparición los agentes fiscales, me aclaran que es un allanamiento, que no es “nada más”. Pido la orden judicial, otros seis se estaban realizando ese día o sucederían en el transcurso de la noche y madrugada en diferentes partes de la ciudad. El motivo, “investigación por el delito de rebelión”, según el Estado, para mí, persecución política.

Comienza el chequeo, la disposición es incautar todo aparato tecnológico, me piden las claves del celular y la pequeña computadora que hace poco había comprado; mi preciado instrumento de trabajo. Hacen lo mismo con la tablet de mi hermana y su celular, algo completamente innecesario, hago extensivo el reclamo, pero insisten que ese es el “procedimiento”. Mientras ella se encontraba completamente descompuesta, entre sollozos y lágrimas; una agente fiscal me pide que la calme, y me pregunto: ¿cómo se supone que debíamos reaccionar si policías armados hasta los dientes ingresan violentamente a nuestro lugar más íntimo?

Mueven libros, fotocopias, discos; revisan debajo de la cama, en los armarios, buscan todo lo que pueda ser alusivo a “rebelión”. Se llevan un afiche, un recuerdo de una movilización sindical en Madrid el 1 de mayo de 2016 cuyo título era “Lucha por tus derechos” y un cuadernillo de apuntes de la Federación Regional Centro Oriente de Organizaciones Sindicales (FRECOOS). Encuentran otro afiche, esta vez de un festival kurdo realizado en Hamburgo en 2017, no entienden alemán, yo tampoco, toman una foto. Me preguntan por una serigrafía que hace poco me regaló un amigo. “Siempre firmes” dice, un puño y una estrella. “¿Qué significa esto?”, pregunta el oficial, “una obra de arte respondo”. Hacen referencia al orden de la casa, a las obras que cuelgan de las paredes, no sé si las admiran o qué.

Me sorprende la “exactitud” y “contundencia” de la búsqueda. No se llevan ningún libro.

Fotos y grabaciones de video, todo se documenta, consulto si puedo hacer lo mismo, o si mi hermana puede registrar con su celular; había olvidado que era prueba. Error. No hay derechos, solo existe la fuerza del Estado en ese momento, es lo único legítimo.

Salimos de la habitación, me piden que los acompañe, vamos a revisar todas las habitaciones, la casa es grande, cuarto por cuarto, cocina, baños, jardín, patio, hasta el gallinero; “ahí están los terroristas” en referencia a las gallinas, señalo entre risas.

En el proceso llegó mi otra hermana, la segunda. La veo fuerte y seria, me tranquiliza verla así, ayuda a contener a nuestra hermana menor.

Me preguntan por si conozco a una persona, les respondo que sí, ¿qué tenía que ocultar? Hablamos del paro, el oficial me cuenta que está realizando una tesis sobre el Paro Nacional. Le comparto un par de hipótesis, insisto en mis profesiones, sociólogo y periodista. No sé si se sorprende al saber que tengo estudios de cuarto nivel y mi interés en el doctorado, como si eso importara. Le recomiendo una lectura sobre seguridad e inteligencia que revisé en la maestría, la anota, no tengo idea si le servirá.

Abordo el tema, les hablo de la persecución política, el caso Contraloría, responden diciendo “¿cómo explica el mismo fenómeno en Bolivia, Chile y Ecuador?” La respuesta es obvia, el neoliberalismo y el fascismo.

Hablamos del correísmo. Les pregunto, “¿la hegemonía en las urnas es transferible a las calles y viceversa?” - “Esa tesis es correcta”, responde el oficial, “¿entonces cómo es que una identidad política cuyo mayor capital político se manifiesta en las urnas pudo haber organizado un Paro Nacional como el que vimos?” El Paro Nacional desbordó a todos, a correístas, no correístas, a la CONAIE, al FUT, fue pueblo puro y duro. La sospecha se mantiene, estamos en orillas diferentes, nuestras perspectivas en torno al hecho son como agua y aceite. No vamos a llegar a un acuerdo.

A inicios del siglo XX el chivo expiatorio eran los anarquistas y los comunistas, “come niños y adoradores del diablo”, hoy son los correístas. A nadie le sirve desenmarcarse del correísmo para escapar a la persecución, vienen por todos los “sospechosos”. De todas formas, en este momento, como dijo un amigo días atrás “si no eres correísta te hacen, no hay de otra”.

Son casi las 24h00, se alistan para dejar la casa, “nada personal, esto es parte del procedimiento”, “debemos hablar de estas cosas más bien”, dice el oficial en referencia a nuestra conversación “académica”, le respondo con una sonrisa, “ojalá más bien no nos volvamos a ver nunca más”. Reímos por un momento.

Firmo el acta, me entregan al final una copia de la orden de allanamiento - resulta que sí habían tenido copia - antes me solicitaban ir a la Fiscalía a pedir una. “Luego de unas semanas, 30 días, podrá ir a retirar sus cosas”, ¿cómo, si no tengo referencia de ellas en el documento firmado?, ¿quién lo garantiza?, recuerdo la computadora a la que tanto cariño había agarrado, y eso que nunca he tenido apego a lo material.

Los acompaño a la puerta, se ponen a las órdenes, la agente fiscal se despide en un tono maternal y vuelve a admirar la casa, “está como para hacer una fiesta”, “qué ordenada su casa, ya viera la mía con dos guaguas”, le ofrezco ayuda y hasta una gallina “para el caldo”.

El día termina, continuamos asimilando los hechos en la medida del amor entre hermanos. En ese momento pienso que lo único que nos queda, es la ideología, nuestra fortaleza y sentido de vida.

Declaración FAO sobre el alzamiento popular iniciado en octubre de 2019 en la región chilena y posicionamiento sobre la coyuntura.

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COMUNICADO PÚBLICO
22 de Octubre, 2019.

Ante los acontecimientos que remecen el modelo de sociedad capitalista neoliberal que impera en el territorio del Estado de Chile, y bajo estado de excepción constitucional de emergencia y toque de queda en las principales ciudades y regiones del país -tal cual en Dictadura-, como Frente Anarquista Organizado [FAO] comunicamos a la clase trabajadora, al conjunto del pueblo y a las organizaciones revolucionarias y anticapitalistas:

El estallido social o levantamiento popular que se origina a raíz del aumento de $30 en el valor del pasaje del servicio de transporte del Metro de la región Metropolitana, fue la gota que rebasó el vaso del descontento social acumulado por 30 años desde el Plebiscito del NO en 1989, donde nos prometieron democracia con el ‘Chile la alegría ya viene’. Pero la alegría nunca llegó y se convirtió en un interminable trago amargo. El pueblo de Chile estaba dormido y por fin despertó, reventándonos en la cara de las organizaciones revolucionarias, sindicales y sociales. Nadie se esperaba una coyuntura de tal envergadura y la verdad es que ninguna fuerza política o social está capacitada, por sí sola o en coordinación para conducir el alzamiento popular y darle una salida política revolucionaria que cuestione y eche por tierra los cimientos estructurales del modelo capitalista neoliberal chileno.

En base a dicho diagnóstico, cabe preguntarnos cuál es la tarea principal y el rol que debemos tener las/os revolucionarios en general y los/as anarquistas en particular dentro del alzamiento para lograr como mínimo conseguir un triunfo y conquista para nuestra gente, cosa de mantener la moral y la frente en alto de que para algo sirvió el estallido y el despertar, y así no quedar desmoralizadas/os por otros 30 años más. En ese sentido, si bien es una oportunidad para plantear nuestras ideas, nuestros fines y formas de organización, hay que ser responsables en cuanto a apuntar a una salida política realizable y ganable, partiendo de la base que la caracterización que hacemos no da para hablar que estamos en una fase pre-revolucionaria ni en una revuelta o insurrección de masas con un claro objetivo rupturista y revolucionario.

En ese sentido, considerando el malestar social que hemos palpado en las movilizaciones en la calle, en las asambleas sindicales y sociales, la primera demanda a plantear en los espacios de lucha donde tengamos presencia debe ser exigir la dimisión del presidente Sebastián Piñera y su gobierno de derecha: por no estar a la altura de las circunstancias, por no entregar ninguna salida estructural a las demandas sentidas de la población alzada y por sacar a los milicos (FFAA) a la calle a reprimir y asesinar a nuestro pueblo, decretando el estado de emergencia y toque de queda apenas las protestas sociales desbordaron el orden social burgués y neoliberal.

Llamamos a levantar asambleas populares en nuestros barrios, sindicatos, organizaciones sociales y comunitarias; asambleas masivas en cada pueblo, comuna y ciudad en resistencia y lucha, coordinadas a nivel provincial, regional y nacional en base a dos preguntas que gatillen la discusión política desde lo social:
1) qué es lo que queremos terminar de este sistema inhumano, lo que queremos transformar y, 2) hacia qué modelo de sociedad queremos avanzar con dichos cambios.

¡NO SON SÓLO 30 PESOS, SINO QUE SON 30 AÑOS!
¡DEL LEVANTAMIENTO POPULAR A LA AUTOGESTIÓN SOCIAL!
¡A RECUPERAR LOS DERECHOS SOCIALES Y SERVICIOS BÁSICOS SAQUEADOS Y PRIVATIZADOS A SANGRE, FUEGO Y TERROR EN DICTADURA!