Ukraine ended the 1980s as one of the most advanced parts of the Soviet super-power with a developed machine-building industry. Thirty years later, Ukraine’s major economic indicators are on a par with many Third World countries. The country is fundamentally dependent on the financial, political, and military support of the West, with politics dominated by a handful of powerful oligarchs, right-wing paramilitaries regularly marching on the streets, and a part of the country annexed by neighboring Russia and another part torn through by the frontline. It can rightfully be called the northernmost country of the Global South. Moreover, there is not any relevant political force with a vision of alternative progressive national development.

Several profound contradictions have defined the dynamics of the Ukrainian economy, politics and society since the collapse of the Soviet Union: the contradiction between transnational and local capital, those between factions of the local capital, Ukrainian national identity contradictions, geopolitical contradictions with Russia, the US, and EU, and contradictions between civil society, the active public, and Ukrainian society at large. I will first expose them, and then discuss how the Ukrainian new left has been failing to respond to these contradictions with a project for Ukraine’s alternative development.

The Major Contradictions of Post-Soviet Ukraine
Since the 1990s, Ukraine joined the global trend of neoliberalization. As in many other countries, privatization, deregulation, and liberalization drastically increased social inequality. Yet, Ukraine did not see the inflow of foreign direct investment and the overtaking of the economy by transnational capital. Rather, ‘insider’ privatization of former Soviet state property produced a local ruling class of so called ‘oligarchs’ who made their fortunes in primarily extractive and low added value export-oriented production. Their major resource was the tight informal connections and selective preferences of the current ruling group in the government. The attack on corruption that has been pressed by Western governments and civil society loyal to their position was primarily aimed at eliminating the oligarchs’ competitive advantage, enforcing transparent rules of business, and opening Ukraine for transnational capital. This is why neoliberalization, at least until the Maidan uprising in 2014, proceeded relatively slowly, gradually, and contradictorily.

For example, legislation in some of the key areas like those around housing and labour issues has remained based on Soviet laws from the 1970s. The prices for utilities had been heavily subsidized for households – a target of regular criticism by the IMF. At the same time, being dependent on selective preferences of the state and risking property, finances and freedom in case of the change of power, local capital had little incentive to invest into modernization and instead has been hiding its money in tax havens not waiting for too risky long-term returns. The remnants of developed Soviet-age heavy industry could therefore hardly win new markets beyond the ex-USSR and some countries of the Global South. Capital flight, massive tax evasion, and a huge shadow economy contributed to the systematic underfinancing and gradual degradation of Ukraine’s public sector, including healthcare, education and welfare institutions.

The contradictions within local capital were also sharp, provided the role of informal selective state preferences in its businesses, and have led to a very turbulent politics in the country. Each major ‘oligarchic’ financial-industrial group attempted to control a parliamentary party or a group of loyal MPs. Each major group tried to influence public opinion with popular TV-channels. The intra-class hegemony within the ruling class has been very weak. Every attempt to monopolize power ended in successful popular and elite counter-mobilization. During the life of just one generation Ukrainians have experienced three ‘revolutions’ – at least in the technical meaning of changes of power combined with popular mobilization – in 1990, 2004, and 2014. Unlike in neighboring Russia or Belarus, no faction of the ruling class has been able to consolidate its power. The political regime has remained pluralistic and competitive, despite all of the anti-democratic features and tendencies.

Weak intra-class hegemony led to weak inter-class hegemony. No class or faction of a class could plausibly claim moral and intellectual leadership of the nation. The regional political split of Ukraine has been widely debated since the Maidan uprising of 2014 and the subsequent war in the eastern region of Donbass. Some have tended to essentialize the differences between “Western,” Ukrainophone, pro-EU, and “Eastern,” Russophone, pro-Russian Ukrainians. Furthermore, they have been regularly instrumentalized and sharpened for electoral purposes by the competing political elites. Yet, the divergent ethnocultural, linguistic, religious practices and consciousness, historical memories, and political attitudes among Ukraine’s regions did have real historical background. Besides, there was also a socio-economic dimension to the regional divergence with concentration in the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine of the heavy Soviet industry dependent on the markets of Russia and other ex-USSR countries.

Moreover, contradictions lay in the core of the very Ukrainian national identity. There has been nothing close to a consensual or even a hegemonic position within Ukrainian society on the questions of what Ukraine and Ukrainians are and what they should be in the future, how they are different from Russia and Russians, or Europe and Europeans. In the beginning of the previous century, in this land, “Ukrainian” was almost equal to a peasant, with the cities dominated by Russian, Jewish, and Polish populations. Early 20th century Ukrainian Marxists were very attentive to the interconnection of social and national oppression. Yet, after Soviet modernization and affirmative action, under the independent Ukrainian state, and, particularly, after the Maidan uprising of 2014, it is not obvious at all which nation in Ukraine is currently ‘oppressed’. Now the representatives of both pro-Western and pro-Russian camps can mobilize national-liberation and anti-discriminatory frames, yet at the same time accepting and justifying subjugation to one or another contending imperialist patron.

The conflict about Ukraine between Russia and the Western countries of the capitalist core (primarily US and EU) has come to the fore since 2014. The contradictions may be characterized as ‘imperialist’ if only we specify what ‘imperialism’ means on both sides. For Russia, Ukraine has been important primarily because of natural gas transportation to Europe, for military security, and for Russia’s self-perception as a great power. EU is interested primarily in a cheap Ukrainian labour force, natural resources, and a consumer market, but not for investment insofar as Ukrainian oligarchs are not tamed and the war in Donbass continues to be a major risk factor. For the United States, Ukraine is primarily a tool to weaken the Russian challenge to American global hegemony. On each side of the conflict there are different factions within the ruling classes with more ‘hawkish’ and more conciliatory positions, for which class analysis is something yet to be done.

The last but not least contradiction important for understanding post-Soviet Ukraine dynamics, is between Ukraine’s civil society and Ukrainian society at large. Ukraine’s civil society has been notoriously weak even by low East European standards. The instances of mass mobilizations and ‘revolutions’ did not form stable institutions of civic self-organization. Most participants remained alienated from the ‘dirty stuff’ of politics. 80-90 per cent of Ukrainian citizens have been stably declaring no participation in any civic or political organization whatsoever. The ‘oligarchic’ electoral machines dominate in parliamentary politics.

For many years the Communists were the largest mobilization party with massive activist, not just paper, membership. Yet, their mobilizing strength has been fading as a result of opportunist party leadership. After anti-Communist repressions since the Maidan uprising, the party basically stopped any public activity. This resulted in a peculiar structure of Ukraine’s active public since 2014 becoming dominated by two major segments: the ‘liberal’ segment of professional think tanks, media, and advocacy organizations boosted with Western donor money, yet with little grassroots mobilization, and the radical nationalist segment that has built party organizations with the strongest (as to the low Ukrainian bar) mobilization potential and has accumulated extraordinary paramilitary resources thanks to weakening state institutions. These segments are interconnected with liberals who typically tolerate and legitimate radical nationalists seen as ‘patriots’ fighting against ‘Russian aggression’ and internal ‘traitors’. They are hegemonic within the civil society, but, because the civil society is weak itself, they cannot claim hegemony in the society at large. The majority of Ukrainians have remained socially paternalistic, averse to neoliberal proposals and in the majority indifferent to nationalistic claims. The landslide victory in the recent presidential elections of an inexperienced comedian Volodymyr Zelensky over a veteran of Ukrainian politics and one of the richest individuals in country, Petro Poroshenko, who balloted on an aggressive nationalist platform and was supported by the majority of civil society and national-liberal intellectuals, exposed this political chasm between the active minority and passive majority.

The New Left’s (lack of) Response
So far, the new left in Ukraine has been failing to respond to these contradictions both politically and analytically. This failure has contributed to the new left’s continued marginalization.

The new left groups in Ukraine, as in many other parts of the Soviet Union, appeared in the late 1980s as a part of perestroika movements. With the start of the severe economic crisis of the 1990s, these movements demobilized and the new left remained primarily in the form of small political sects and subcultural groups: Trotskyist, Maoist, anarchist etc. The key question for them and the major lines of discussions were not so much about post-Soviet capitalism and Ukraine’s contradictions but about what the Soviet Union was. A version of a critical position toward the USSR defined the opposition to the ‘old left’ Communist party of Ukraine as well as of the different groups to each other.

The so called “Orange Revolution” against the attempt to steal the presidential elections in 2004 by ‘pro-Russian’ Viktor Yanukovych from ‘pro-Western’ Viktor Yushchenko produced a new political situation. On the one hand, many new, and particularly, young, people came to politics. Specifically, local urban activism was galvanized. On the other hand, many of these people were becoming more and more skeptical toward the major political forces, observing no revolutionary change after the ‘revolution’ but instead, compromises and strategic agreements between the rivalling ‘oligarchic’ camps. Some of these newly politicized young people were drifting toward the left, where they met radical splinter groups from the ‘old left’ parties, who were disappointed with the opportunist leadership that aligned itself with one or another major ‘oligarchic’ camp. At the same time, the small radical left sects were trying to de-marginalize and started actively intervening into local social protests.

As a result, the new left’s attention was focused on the particularistic problem of specific social groups. In some cases, for example, within student protests, the new left reached at least temporary success, noteworthily benefiting from the weak civil society and low mobilization potential of the mainstream student organizations. However, analytically, these specific problems were approached employing concepts and arguments from the Western left that rarely reflected in-depth specifics of post-Soviet neoliberalism and capitalism. At the same time, the crucial contradictions, foremost, the national and geopolitical, within and about Ukraine, were largely perceived as ‘pseudo-problems’ that rivalling ‘oligarchic’ camps employed to divide Ukrainian workers of the “East” and of the “West” and distract them from their common class interests.

This left Ukraine’s new left movement largely unprepared to deal with the Maidan uprising of 2014 and the following war in Donbass. Failing to provide their own analysis of the exacerbated Ukraine’s contradictions, they accepted right-wing answers. Instead of opposing nationalist mobilizations and counter-mobilizations, most of the new left joined either Maidan, “pro-Western,” “pro-Ukrainian” or Anti-Maidan, “pro-Russian” nationalist camps as marginal supporters. At the same time, they could not contribute any critical resource to the movements – unlike ‘oligarchic’ parties, liberal NGOs, or radical nationalists – and, therefore, the new left did not make any significant impact on the the agendas or consequences of the movements. As a result, the new left did not shift those mobilizations to the left but rather themselves moved toward nationalist positions.

Marginalization of the ‘old left’ Communist party after the Maidan uprising did not benefit the new left. Repressions, and particularly the violence of the empowered and legitimated extreme right touched the new left as well. Besides, they were stigmatized as ‘pro-Russian’ and weakened by severe internal splits. Membership in new left groups, their public activity and even communication significantly dropped; they are now, perhaps, on the lowest level than any time since emergence of the socialist movement on what are nowadays Ukrainian lands in the XIX century.

Prospects?
The stunning electoral victories of Volodymyr Zelensky and his virtual party “Servant of the People” in 2019 demonstrated a profound crisis and lack of legitimacy of Ukrainian political, economic, and intellectual elites. They have also confirmed the predominance of personalistic political culture with little attention to the programmatic ideas and political organizations. The new government and the first legislative proposals indicate that the ‘new’ elite will continue to maneuver between transnational capital and local oligarchs. Lacking any real party or movement behind Zelenskyi, government positions are staffed with representatives of the liberal segment of civil society, second- or third-rate officials from the previous government, and oligarchic lobbyists.

The policies of deregulation, ‘anti-corruption’ and privatization in order to attract foreign investors will be limited only by the special interests of the oligarchs close to the government. The president and government officials have been also regularly conceding to the pressure of radical nationalists. The latter enjoy only a minority support within society, yet are very active and well-organized and, moreover, legitimated by liberal civil society. Overall, the new government’s policies have not broken with the trap of dependent development of a capitalist periphery. Sooner or later the search for a radically alternative project of national development will be back on the agenda.

Yet, the new left, as it is now, will hardly be able to respond to this demand with in-depth analysis and serious strategic proposals. The new left activists remain in the comfort zone of convenient topics of specific groups of the active public (urban initiatives, feminist, environmentalist, some labour unions). This is because they remain politically, financially, intellectually, and affectively dependent on the marginal left-liberal segment of Ukraine’s civil society. Moreover, uncritical acceptance of the ‘movementist ideology, popular among contemporary liberal and libertarian left, is counter-productive for Ukrainian new left. If the various ‘new’ and single-issue movements have massive following in the West and help to enhance the reach of left political agenda, their analogues in Ukraine hardly represent wider social groups. Seeking recognition with the activists of small organizations within weak civil society, the new left rather marginalizes itself even more as it remains detached from the concerns and political culture of Ukraine’s passive majority. In this respect learning from Corbyn’s, Sanders’, or Melenchon’s and even more so of the Third World progressive leaders’ effective articulation of the national interest could be much more instructive.

This failure of the Ukrainian new left’s strategic analysis is an expected consequence. Despite some important data collection, the new left has been failing to suggest an integrative analysis and consistent solutions for the major contradictions of Ukraine’s society which are essential for addressing a nation-wide public beyond specific group interests and for any serious political strategy in general. Neither systematically underfinanced Ukrainian academia, nor the more than marginal new left movement, nor specific interest groups in the weak civil society can support or even formulate a demand for such analysis. The short-term project-oriented funding of the left-leaning Western foundations is also not conducive. The most interesting analysis of the contradictions discussed above have been so far proposed by people affiliated with Western academia and not even necessarily with left-leaning political orientations.

Where might a social demand for a left analysis in Ukraine come from? One of the positive consequences of Zelensky’s victory has been politicization and mobilization of ‘no-voters’, particularly, young people in the big cities of south-eastern regions. Disappointed with the old policies of the ‘new faces’ in the government, many of them may search for alternative substantial answers to the urgent questions of Ukraine’s national development which they will not find from national-liberal intellectuals and civil society. The latter will be losing their influence even more as the crisis of the world-system will be deeper and cracks in the institutional pillars of American hegemony and the neoliberal global order will be wider. At the same time, new political forces in Ukraine (emerging not necessarily from the new left milieu) will be positioning themselves as representatives and speakers for the ‘betrayed’ majority. Political success of the left parties and leaders in the key core capitalist countries will certainly increase interest in their policies and ideologies locally and will legitimate framing of Ukraine’s majority’s interest in a left-wing progressive way. Then, the contradiction between capital and labour, the fundamental for any capitalist society, yet not articulated in Ukraine so far, will finally get its political representation in this land.

Αυτή η εκπληκτικά πρώιμη όσο και ρηξικέλευθη κριτική απόρριψη της μαρξικής θεωρίας καθώς και του πρώτου της βλαστού, της σοσιαλδημοκρατίας, από τον εν πολλοίς λησμονημένο αναρχικό επαναστάτη και ουμανιστή Πιερ Ράμους -φιλολογικό ψευδώνυμο του Αυστριακού Ρούντολφ Γκρόσμαν- γράφτηκε εν μέσω του Πρώτου Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου, το 1916, και εκδόθηκε τρία χρόνια μετά.

Πιερ Ράμους, Η λανθασμένη θεωρία του μαρξισμού

Αυτή η εκπληκτικά πρώιμη όσο και ρηξικέλευθη κριτική απόρριψη της μαρξικής θεωρίας καθώς και του πρώτου της βλαστού, της σοσιαλδημοκρατίας, από τον εν πολλοίς λησμονημένο αναρχικό επαναστάτη και ουμανιστή Πιερ Ράμους -φιλολογικό ψευδώνυμο του Αυστριακού Ρούντολφ Γκρόσμαν- γράφτηκε εν μέσω του Πρώτου Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου, το 1916, και εκδόθηκε τρία χρόνια μετά.

Η εγκαθίδρυση της λενινιστικής και της μουσολινικής δικτατορίας ώθησε τον Ράμους να επανεκδώσει το έργο του το 1926 -η παρούσα ελληνική μετάφραση βασίζεται σε αυτή τη δεύτερη έκδοση-, συμπληρώνοντάς το με την κριτική των δύο άλλων βλαστών του μαρξισμού, του μπολσεβικισμού και του φασισμού, οι οποίοι ωστόσο, όπως λέει ο ίδιος, «αποτελούν απλώς διαφορετικά ονόματα των σταδίων της ακατάσχετης αυτοδιάλυσης του μαρξισμού, μια αυτοδιάλυση που έχει ως σκοπό τόσο τη σωτηρία του σοσιαλισμού και του προλεταριάτου όσο επίσης και την απελευθέρωση της ανθρωπότητας».

(Από την παρουσίαση στο οπισθόφυλλο του βιβλίου)

Περιεχόμενα

Βιογραφικό σημείωμα
Εισαγωγή: Μαρξισμός και εργατικό κίνημα, σοσιαλδημοκρατία και μπολσεβικισμός
Πρώτο μέρος: Το σάπιο φιλοσοφικό θεμέλιο του μαρξισμού
Δεύτερο μέρος: Η υλιστική αντίληψη της ιστορίας
Τρίτο μέρος: Το αντισοσιαλιστικό στοιχείο στο «Κομμουνιστικό Μανιφέστο» και στον μαρξισμό
Τέταρτο μέρος: Οι λανθασμένες εθνικοοικονομικές θεωρίες του μαρξισμού
Ι. Εθνική οικονομία και μαρξισμός
II. Το θεμελιώδες σφάλμα στο «Κεφάλαιο»
III. Η μαρξική μεταφυσική για τον «ελεύθερο» εργάτη
IV. Το πρόβλημα της αξίας
V. Η θεωρία της υπεραξίας
VI. Οι αυτοαντιφάσεις του Μαρξ στην παρουσίαση που κάνει όσον αφορά τη νόμιμη μείωση της ημέρας εργασίας
Πέμπτο μέρος: Οι μαρξικοί παράγοντες κατάρρευσης του καπιταλιστικού τρόπου παραγωγής
Ι. Τα τελευταία στηρίγματα του μαρξιστικού οικοδομήματος ιδεών
II. Η ουσία της καπιταλιστικής συσσώρευσης
III. Η τάση συγκέντρωσης και συγκεντρωτισμού
IV. Η κατάρρευση της μεσαίας τάξης και ο πόλεμος αλληλοεξόντωσης των καπιταλιστών
V. Η αποτυχία του μαρξισμού στο γεωργικό τομέα της παραγωγής
VI. Οι κρίσεις
Έκτο μέρος: Μαρξισμός, φασισμός και η προλεταριακή ταξική πάλη
Έβδομο μέρος: Η ριζική απόρριψη του μαρξισμού ως προϋπόθεση του σοσιαλιστικού απελευθερωτικού αγώνα
I. Η αναρχική αυτοαναίρεση της μαρξιστικής πολιτικής οικονομίας
II. Απομάκρυνση από τον μαρξισμό: Η πρώτη προϋπόθεση για ένα νέο ξεκίνημα του σοσιαλισμού

What happens next after Trump's impeachment and trial? What is the Democratic vs. Republican conflict really about? Does the Constitution provide any guidance? How should anarchists and other radicals position themselves politically?

As I write this, the U.S. House of Representatives has passed articles of impeachment against President Donald J. Trump—by its Democratic Party majority. Unless an asteroid hits the earth, Trump will be acquitted, by the Senate’s Republican majority. This is in spite of the way in which the personally vile Trump has repeatedly abused his power, broken laws, violated the Constitution, truckled to foreign governments for his own interests, and acted in a generally incompetent manner against both human decency and the interests of the U.S. imperial state. His actions include the caging of children at the U.S./Mexican border, the betrayal of the Kurds, a war on the environment, making money off the presidency, and, most recently, almost causing war with Iran without consulting Congress. These make the issues listed in the impeachment articles (which are real and justified) seem minor, like the indictment of Al Capone for tax evasion. After the Senate acquittal, both parties will gear up for the 2020 national elections, less than a year away.

At the same time, Democrats and Republicans have worked to produce several “bipartisan” bills of significance. This includes a lightly updated North American trade bill, opposed by the Autoworkers and Machinists unions and which does nothing against global warming The two parties passed a new military policy bill. At $738 billion it is one of most expensive military plans in U.S. history. It authorized a new branch of the military, a “Space Force.” It does nothing to prevent Trump from again raiding military funds to pay for his idiotic, nativist, border “wall.” It continues military support of the U.S. for Saudi Arabia’s aggression against Yemen. The bill was passed over the objections of a handfull of progressive Democrats and “libertarian” Republicans.

The Democrats claimed that this was the best military bill they could get. They pointed to its expansion of family leave for government employees. But really the Democrats agree with the Republicans on the key issues: the need for massive U.S. military power, bigger than the next 9 military forces combined; the need for dozens of military bases around the globe; for being able to wage several wars at once; for enough nuclear bombs to be able to exterminate humanity several times over. These goals have been carried out through a series of Democratic presidents and Democratic-dominated Congresses, well before Trump. Consider President Obama, who passed a hugely expanded nuclear missile program, stepped-up the war in Afghanistan, and used drones to kill people around the world in countries with which the U.S. was not at war.

These military and trade laws show the real nature of the political system we live under. Democrats and Republicans, while squabbling over the spoils, are in fundamental (“bipartisan”) agreement over maintaining U.S. military might and domination of world trade.

The Impeachment

As soon as he was elected in 2016, there were Democrats who called for Trump’s impeachment; these calls increased after the 2018 mid-term elections which returned the House to Democratic control. But the established leadership of the Democrats, especially Nancy Pelosi (House Speaker and Democratic leader), opposed impeachment. They felt that it was too dangerous for them politically, that it would turn off moderate “independents,” and that it might rouse up the Republican base. A number of Democrats had been elected in fairly conservative districts; better not risk their re-elections. There was only a year or so until the next election; it would be wiser to focus on health care, raising wages, drug policies, and other bread-and-butter issues. So they reasoned.

These calculations may have been right, from the viewpoint of conventional politics. We will see how impeachment actually impacts on the next election. But the Democratic leaders probably had no choice, once Trump’s shenanigans with the Ukrainians came to light. Lacking any sense of right or wrong, and being fairly stupid, the freakish Trump simply could not hold himself back from outrageous and illegal behavior. They had to respond.

The Republicans’ defense of Trump has been rather limited. He didn’t do it, and anyway you can’t prove he did it, and even if he did do it, it wasn’t so bad as to be worth impeachment and removal. Trump himself has rejected the last “defense”—he wants complete exoneration. The Republicans have tried to confuse the issue every way possible, by denouncing the Democrats’ motives (they don’t like the president!), condemning the process, claiming that Trump was really trying to deal with Ukrainian corruption (as if Trump was ever concerned about corruption besides what he could get away with!). They even puffed up the nutty conspiracy theory that the Ukrainians, rather than the Russians, intervened in the 2016 U.S. elections. (Why the Ukrainians? Why not the Zambians or Uruguayans?)

The Trumpites have a point about the Bidens. When Joe Biden was Vice President and frequently dealing with Ukraine for President Obama, his son Hunter Biden got a high-paying job on the board of a Ukrainian oil company. His only qualification seems to have been his last name. Whether there was any actual U.S. government help for his company, it was not very ethical. But for Trump, with his family making business deals all over the place while he is president, to cry “corruption” is laughable.

The Constitution

Everyone swears deep love for the U.S. Constitution. Indeed the Constitution is a founding myth of the system. It was drawn up by a coalition mostly of big landowners, merchants, and slaveowners. They did not want another king nor a revolutionary dictator (this was before the French Revolution but not that long since the English Revolution had resulted in the dictatorship of Cromwell). But they also did not want a “democracy,” which most of them regarded as mob rule. (“Your people, sir, are a great beast!” said Hamilton.) Too much power to the majority might result in breaking up big landed estates or cheap money policies which would benefit poor debtors. So they devised this system with its two houses (the Senate with six year terms), different election years for different positions, two Senators from each state regardless of population size, Supreme Court judges for life, limited controls on a president (an elected monarch), the Electoral College, and so on. The undemocratic aspects of the Constitution were so obvious, that the Jeffersonian left would only support it if they got a promise to add a Bill of Rights immediately after its passage.

The founders did not foresee the evolution of the parliamentary system, where an unpopular leader can be challenged through a vote of confidence. So they put in the impeachment process as an emergency control on a corrupt or dangerous president. They also did not foresee the two-party system, which has made impeachment such a difficult matter.

As history ground on, the Constitution got better in some ways, such as abolishing slavery, providing the right of women to vote, and being “interpreted” as including a “right to privacy” which protected women’s reproductive rights and LGBT people. But the current system remains essentially undemocratic, with its gerrymandered election districts, the domination of big money in elections, the massive lobbying, the biased media (now with overtly reactionary television and radio channels and social media), and so on. While not a fascist or Stalinist dictatorship, neither is this truly a democracy. That is why I am not excited by fervent statements of loyalty to the Constitution raised by hypocritical politicians of whatever stripe.

The Democrats are not so much interested in reviving the Constitution as in restoring business-as-usual for U.S. capitalism. They want the national state to be run rationally and smoothly. They want at least the appearance of concern over global warming, without actually ending fossil fuel use. They want to seem to care about benefits for the working class. They want other nations’ governments to trust the U.S. again, to rely on the U.S. military and diplomatic policies. They want reasonable government efforts to limit economic downturns, to the extent this is possible. They want immigration reforms to provide cheap labor for big business. They want to keep a lid on overt fascist and racist movements. They want trade deals to keep wages down and promote profits. Sections of the capitalist class which have traditionally supported the Republicans also want these things.

During the impeachment hearings in the House, the Democrats made a point of puffing up the security forces of the CIA and FBI, foreign affairs officials, military officers, bureaucrats, and others whom Trump has denigrated as the “deep state.” Instead, they praised the professionalism, honesty, patriotism, and honor of these people. Whatever their personal virtues (being more honest than Trump is a low bar), these people are part of the repressive and imperial apparatus of the state—what the left has long called the “permanent government.” They have overthrown foreign governments and supported terrorism around the globe.

Just recently a scandal broke out. It was shown that the FBI had cut corners and even lied to judges (!) in applying for warrants to investigate people. Since the victims were on the right (as opposed to leftists or poor people of color), this was shocking, shocking! Also a movie is showing about the CIA’s torture of prisoners and destruction of evidence afterwards (The Report, with Adam Driver). Such matters were not raised during the hearings.

The Underlying Problem

The Republicans and Democrats are thrashing about because they are dealing with an unprecedented situation. Within the U.S. and on a world scale, the capitalist economy is weak. After the shock of the Great Recession, the recovery has been weak, uneven, and brittle. Those at the top have gained much, while the rest of the population has had stagnant wages, insecure jobs, and poverty-stricken regions, with vastly increased inequality. Mainstream economists are greatly worried that when the inevitable downturn comes, the system will not have the resources to deal with it. Meanwhile global warming is advancing at an alarming rate, with nothing being done to moderate it, let alone reverse it (even as Australia burns). Wars continue to rage around the world, always with the background threat of nuclear extermination. The rulers of the U.S. are frantic about the decline of U.S. power and wealth in the world, which has led to the increased influence of China. Since at least Obama, the U.S. state had determined to “pivot” toward China (new military bases in Australia, etc.) but it has remained stuck in the secondary theater of the Middle East. Having a totally incompetent national administration has only exacerbated matters.

One result of these developments has been a massive increase in popular dissatisfaction. Given the U.S.’s politics and culture, much of this has been channeled into the right. Despite all his failures, Trump has the staunch support of about 40 % of the voting population. This Trumpian “base” dominates the Republican party. Once a broad right party, it has become utterly reactionary. A big minority of this minority is neo-fascist (for using guns to overturn the more-or-less democratic mechanisms of the state) while a small but vocal minority is overtly fascist (Nazi or Klan). This right-wing growth is partly due to racism, nativism, and misogyny. White evangelicals are at the core of Trump’s base, motivated by superstition and sexual hysteria (fear of homosexuality, women who are sexually free, and Mexican “rapists”). But for many people, attraction to Trump is also due to economic decline, poor jobs, and real suffering, all associated (correctly) with the status quo of established Democrats and Republicans.

On the other hand, there has been an increase on the left of liberalism and even “socialism.” About 40 % of the population has a favorable view of “socialism” and so does an even higher percentage of younger people. What “socialism” is, or what they mean by it, is quite unclear of course, but it is no longer an evil word to the extent it once was. Bernie Sanders has an apparent possibility of winning the Democratic nomination, while calling himself a “democratic socialist” and calling for a “political revolution.” The Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) has grown to about 60 thousand members. Despite having an anarchist caucus, the DSA is strongly electoralist and deep into the Democratic Party. In no way is it as militant on the left as the Republican base is on the right. Meanwhile, the part of the historic left with the potentially greatest power, the unions, is mostly quiescent. Their leaders are totally tied to the Democratic Party, even as union numbers decline. There have been some important strikes, but no movement for a major working class struggle against capitalist attacks. But this may yet change as conditions worsen.

As the situation decays, the middle falls away. Even so, there are cries to return even more to the center—a center which is further to the right than it was in the past. As I write, the Democrats are torn between those who want to swing to the “left” and those who insist on sticking to the “middle”. How much should they promise the voters? How much should they worry about turning off their big donors? How much should they worry about the “moderate” voters (who have been deliberately miseducated by these same big capitalists)? How much should they rely on exciting their own base by promising them all sorts of new approaches? But will they risk disappointing their excited base when they are unable to carry out their promises once elected? (The DSAers are excited about “socialist” candidates but seem to have no knowledge of the history of socialist politicians elected to manage capitalist states. They are apparently ignorant of recent examples, such as Lula in Brazil, Syriza in Greece, the ANC in South Africa, Morales in Bolivia, Allende in Chile, the Labour Party in Britain, etc., etc., and so on. Socialist electoralism has never ended well.)

Personally, I regard Trump’s impeachment as probably a Good Thing But I doubt that even a Senatorial removal of Trump (not going to happen) would be a Very Good Thing. No, not even the defeat of Trump in the 2020 national election (a probable but not certain outcome). It would be good to see him gone, this disgusting human being and malign influence. But the fundamental problems would remain: the decline of U.S. and world capitalism, the growth of inequality, the looming environmental crisis, the continuing wars, the dangerous right wing movement (including the growth of outright fascism), and the incapacity of the rulers—conservative and liberal—to know how to handle any of this.

As the left wing grows, in rebellion against both the conservatives and the Democratic liberals, we have to build a revolutionary, anti-imperialist, libertarian socialist, direct action, and anti-electoralist wing of the movement. If at all possible.

Escrevo estas palavras enquanto o povo equatoriano joga sua sorte nas ruas de Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca e demais municípios e regiões do país. Este texto não pretende fazer um balanço crítico da luta indígena e social contra o Pacto 883 do traidor Lenín Moreno e tampouco uma análise de conjuntura a partir da intervenção do FMI no país. O tema de fundo é outro.

13 de outubro de 2019 – Bruno Lima Rocha
Introdução ao tema
Escrevo estas palavras enquanto o povo equatoriano joga sua sorte nas ruas de Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca e demais municípios e regiões do país. Este texto não pretende fazer um balanço crítico da luta indígena e social contra o Pacto 883 do traidor Lenín Moreno e tampouco uma análise de conjuntura a partir da intervenção do FMI no país. O tema de fundo é outro.
Pode parecer meio pretensioso, mas entendo que é necessário desenvolvermos os debates urgentes para a esquerda no século XXI, ao menos as esquerdas mais à esquerda operando na e para a América Latina e o Caribe. Os temas são vários e apontam problemas graves. Por exemplo, uma chaga histórica para começar: as correntes autoritárias ainda trabalham com a hipótese de partido único? Ao que parece no discurso sim, embora no mundo prático essa hipótese esteja cada vez mais distante (ainda bem).
E, por outro lado, será que existe vida fora e além da social-democracia? Entendo que sim, mas é preciso formalizar algum modelo de futura sociedade. O "realismo socialista" ou as ditaduras de partido único - com Nomenklatura burocrática, como na antiga União Soviética, ou ainda, no poder na heroica Argélia anticolonial - ou de líderes tirânicos como Enver Hoxha na Albânia ou Nicolae Ceausescu na Romênia, deixaram péssimos exemplos. Tais modelos execráveis de tirania política geram muito combustível para a direita mais asquerosa, a exemplo dos seguidores de Steve Bannon, como o presidente Jair Bolsonaro.
A ausência de crítica é outro problema, pois impede uma análise rigorosa de governos de exceção, como o de Nicolás Maduro, embora este mesmo governo seja heroicamente anti-imperialista e como tal o povo venezuelano deve receber solidariedade incondicional. O seguidismo (como no governo Jango, com o lema “manda brasa, presidente!”) quase sempre é a história de uma tragédia anunciada. Imaginemos a luta equatoriana se a CONAIE não tivesse autonomia organizativa e sua capacidade estratégica intacta após uma década de criminalização pelo governo de Rafael Correa?
Se não queremos isso de jeito algum, logo, queremos o quê? Uma pista: pluripartidarismo de esquerda com uma Constituição Plurinacional? Sim, esse seria o caminho. Dando base para tal, é necessária uma multiplicidade de representações sociais, étnico-culturais e políticas? Sim, óbvio que sim. E a democracia liberal, representativa e burguesa basta? Não, não basta e já está dando seu limite, mesmo no jogo institucional. Logo, qual a defesa de projeto? Uma democracia social com economia parcialmente planificada? Seria o mínimo para compor um ou mais programas comuns, onde as empresas estratégicas estatais deveriam ter controle social e democracia interna como forma de operar como agente do poder de veto da jogatina de partidos fisiológicos e ataques de grupos econômicos - nacionais ou transnacionais. Enfim, nesta retomada da resistência massiva contra o neoliberalismo, é preciso superar – e muito – o triste papel da coalizão de classes e a visão “ingênua” da ação do imperialismo em nosso Continente. Washington (sob tutela republicana ou democrata) não aceita a “coexistência pacífica” e isso está desenhando.
Urge debater o mínimo para ao menos podermos defender ou vir a cometer erros diferentes e acertos mais precisos. E falta teoria, muita teoria.
Teoria do Poder Social como materialização do Pensamento Decolonial?
Estudantes de graduação com quem tenho a alegria e o privilégio de conviver me comentaram algo que tento sintetizar e faço acordo. O "pensamento decolonial" é um absoluto como discurso historiográfico, a revisão necessária, a base discursiva que coloca as Américas de ponta cabeça e faz com que, mesmo não sendo de origem indígena, nos sintamos invadidos em Pindorama e, ainda que metade do país não tenha ascendência africana, nos posicionemos como Palmarinos afro-centrados. Até aí, perfeito, divino maravilhoso como a tropicália.
Mas, e a teoria do poder social que advêm dos territórios em luta e resistência? Falta outro pedaço, incluindo uma teoria econômica que seja ao mesmo tempo ecologicamente sustentável e habilite um território a se defender dos ataques que certamente virão. Neste sentido, é correta a crítica do antropólogo libertário David Graeber. Vale ressaltar que, sua contribuição é fantástica e vale a pena conhecer ao menos a parcela mais política obra. Mas, como quase todo “reconhecido” intelectual anglo-saxão, seu aporte carece de saídas viáveis, ao menos, de formas de vir a pensar em alternativas passíveis de execução. Ressalto que a presença de Graeber, assim como a de Noam Chomsky, é fundamental eu diria. Logo, aqui não se trata de crítica direta, mas sim como parte do debate de quem quer se somar e construir no mesmo caminho.
Pistas de categoria-chave para uma Teoria do Poder Social
Território: parece evidência e obviedade, mas o conceito de território é categoria-chave, dessas poderosas mesmo, para ajudar tanto na defesa dos direitos ameaçados como para ser propositivo a partir de um eixo de resistência. Para além do direito ancestral e inalienável, a defesa e o desenvolvimento autóctone dos territórios indígenas e quilombolas podem ajudar, e muito, muito, tanto o desenvolvimento sustentável e sem agredir os biomas, como também ser embrião de sociedades menos injustas. O conceito de território da mancha metropolitana ajuda também, mas em geral é usado no capitalismo ilegal e na repressão social. Sem querer exagerar o papel dos bons teóricos, geógrafos como Élisée Reclus, Piotr Kropotkin, Milton Santos e Aziz Ab'Saber seriam hoje de uma releitura quase obrigatória para a interpretação da categoria do território, para além do que já existe e é auto-organizado nas extensões de terra dos povos originários ou tradicionais.
Degeneração da liderança: outra categoria-chave é evitar a degeneração da liderança política. Esse é um tema clássico e aqui vai só um início de debate. Reconhece-se que existe liderança política e algumas atribuições facilmente identificáveis como: carisma, oratória, exemplo, dedicação, trajetória, capacidade resolutiva. Mas, quando estas características se cristalizam em uma estrutura de poder permanente?! Piorando. É quando isso se torna culto à personalidade?!

Mazelas típicas: as mazelas no pensamento e propaganda de esquerda precisam ser interpretadas, localizadas e severamente combatidas. Quais fenômenos da interna política levam ao culto à personalidade? Como forças políticas enormes dependem necessariamente de um grupo muito reduzido de "dirigentes"? O culto da liderança não é também um elogio ao individualismo, às lutas mais mesquinhas pelo poder? Creio que a resposta é sim para tudo, logo, a necessidade de criar mecanismos institucionais (das instituições sociais digo) que evitem essas práticas, mas desde o nascedouro das experiências ou de seus saltos organizativos. Na metade do caminho, a correção é bem mais difícil.
Outra mazela é a ilusão do discurso. Qual o maior equívoco da esquerda, não da ex-esquerda, mas da esquerda restante? Determinismo sociológico (em busca da classe ou fração de classe prometida) ou ilusão com as próprias análises que levam a algum tipo de auto-proclamação?! No caso equatoriano, se observa que há tensões entre a população auto-organizada, como a representada pela CONAIE e a FUT, e uma esquerda urbana, mais ideologizada, que busca ver o que há “de proletário” nestas demandas que são anteriores à formação do próprio proletariado. Superar este tipo de alienação livresca é fundamental para toda a América Latina que se organiza de novo e de novo.
Apontando conclusões óbvias
Tomo a ousadia de compilar um guia básico para sair do cientificismo ou da auto ilusão da retórica filosófica mal aplicada na política. A primeira passa pela convicção ideológica. Os valores fundamentais não são negociáveis e ultrapassam até mesmo o caráter das identidades políticas. Não há como tergiversar sobre liberdade política, direito a multiplicidade de representações, democracia direta e projetos autossustentáveis. O que é inegociável é objetivo finalista e demarca as possibilidades da grande estratégia.
Outra dimensão é o ajuste da doutrina do emprego nos períodos históricos determinados. Por exemplo, se a meta é o protagonismo do povo organizado e o empoderamento de diversos sujeitos sociais, as formas de alcançar estas conquistas podem variar ou incorporar elementos novos de mobilização e acumulação de força social. Mas não há como abrir mão destas formas de acumular força, caso contrário, não se tem nada mesmo.
Todas e todos que não confundimos ideologia com ciência e entendemos que a teoria está a serviço da análise e não apenas como reforço discursivo de um sistema de crenças, todos nós, todas nós temos dúvidas teóricas. Mas a incerteza das possibilidades não se confunde com a crença naquilo que é correto diante das possibilidades concretas da vida em sociedade em nosso Continente. Utopia é lugar a ser construído e neste sentido está mais distante uma utopia liberal-republicana com “instituições funcionando perfeitamente” do que um território libertado através do poder do povo organizado. Qual utopia nós queremos? Quem somos nós no curto, médio e longo prazos? Quais instituições substituem e antes, coexistem, com a “normalidade institucional aparente” neste ciclo de “golpes institucionais” inaugurado há dez anos com a derrubada do presidente hondurenho Manuel Zelaya Rosales em junho de 2009?
Ou temos projetos viáveis ou seremos reféns das circunstâncias ou de lideranças cristalizadas sem uma democracia social e participativa operando.
Bruno Lima Rocha (estrategiaeanaliseblog.com / blimarocha@gmail.com / t.me/estrategiaeanalise) é pós-doutorando em economia política, doutor e mestre em ciência política, graduado em jornalismo e professor nos cursos de relações internacionais, direito e comunicação social. Mais importante, é brasileiro e latino-americano.

Neste breve artigo, compilo observações dos embates recentes os quais participei neste início de outubro de 2019. A divisão por tópicos pode facilitar a leitura embora reconheça que na tradição mais “ortodoxa” dos textos das esquerdas, quebra o ritmo da narrativa. Entre prós e contras, seguimos,.

07 de Outubro de 2019, Bruno Lima Rocha
Apresentação
Existe uma nova onda na internet brasileira, especificamente o uso político da rede, que é interessante e ao mesmo tempo merece um alerta. Há um esforço considerável e reconhecido para normalizar os crimes de Stálin, e não só, de recuperar toda a experiência do Leste Europeu e ligar simbolicamente à presença da China hoje, como a Superpotência Mandarim. Neste breve artigo, compilo observações dos embates recentes os quais participei neste início de outubro de 2019. A divisão por tópicos pode facilitar a leitura embora reconheça que na tradição mais “ortodoxa” dos textos das esquerdas, quebra o ritmo da narrativa. Entre prós e contras, seguimos.
A NEP antissoviética, a China capitalista e a alucinação da “esquerda” viúva do Leste Europeu
Os "amigos" que defendem e se escoram na NEP (Nova Economia Política, “nova” no paradigma do marxismo russo) - a segunda grande traição Bolchevique, com Lenin vivo e Trotsky e Stálin trabalhando lado a lado - usam um argumento que cola no delírio pós Guerra Fria de mistificação dos processos históricos. Entre a falsificação do século XX e as ilusões no século XXI resta uma conclusão. Se não passar a limpo a NEP e fizer uma crítica sem dó, alucinados como esses vão "interpretar" a Gazprom (ou a Huawei, talvez a Cargill) como uma etapa necessária, de repente "intermediária" esperando que um Estado autocrata de base capitalista se "autodissolva" um dia por passe de mágica com "razão dialética" ou qualquer outro jogo de palavras sem sentido. Como não pensar que a tradição autoritária floresce nas cloacas da história?
Stálin, a Nomenklatura e o Hobbesianismo por esquerda
Sempre pergunto em aulas de Política se a turma, hipoteticamente, aceitaria viver numa sociedade de pleno bem estar, com todos os direitos assegurados, todos mesmo (trabalho, saúde, moradia, cultura, lazer, gestação, desporto etc.), mas com absoluto controle e cerceamento dos direitos políticos. Ou seja, ditadura de partido único e a filiação ao partido como a única forma de acesso a postos-chave no aparelho de Estado. As quatro elites formais na antiga URSS, a política, a acadêmica, militar e econômica (na gestão das empresas estatais) tinham como critério de entrada a filiação ao PCURSS. Em geral não digo que esta sociedade existiu e o exemplo dado é no período soviético da Nomenklatura, especificamente nos governos Kruschev e Brejnev. Ou seja, reforço o mito da “tentação autoritária”, o que geralmente no Brasil é associado a posições imaginárias como sendo conservadoras e à direita.
Surpreendentemente, a imensa maioria diz que NÃO, JAMAIS ACEITARIA, pois na ausência de direitos políticos não teriam certeza da garantia ou ao menos da possibilidade de lutar por estes direitos. Quando digo que este mundo existiu e sua era de ouro durou quase quarenta anos há muita surpresa. Hobbes, coitado, é muito mal interpretado e ficaria feliz em ver o direito à vida plena em termos materiais aplicado na antiga União Soviética. Mas, e o direito político? Então, quando a elite da Nomenklatura virou de lado (a partir de 1988) e dilapidou o patrimônio público, o Estado ruiu em menos de quatro anos. Parafraseando nosso poeta maior “E agora José, a festa acabou e teu ‘ônibus da história’ despencou barranco abaixo”. Para não parecer terra arrasada de toda a experiência, apesar ao menos deixa o exemplo de que uma economia planificada, mesmo que estupidamente centralizada, pode gerar bem estar social.
As características estruturantes dessa forma de pensamento político por “esquerda”
São mais que reconhecidos os crimes do stalinismo, seus asseclas e clones mundo afora (como Enver Hoxha na Albânia, Nicolae Ceausescu na Romênia, Kim IlSung na Coreia do Norte e a lista segue conforme a perspectiva histórica e ideológica). Infelizmente, parece que o mito supera o fato e a compreensão perde para a interpretação. Vejamos alguns problemas fundamentais, de estrutura mesmo.
Quais fenômenos da interna política levam ao culto à personalidade? Como forças políticas enormes dependem necessariamente de um grupo muito reduzido de "dirigentes"? O culto da liderança não é também um elogio ao individualismo, às lutas mais mesquinhas pelo poder?
Também cabe perguntar. Qual o maior equívoco da esquerda, não da ex-esquerda, mas da esquerda restante? Determinismo sociológico (em busca da classe ou fração de classe prometida) ou ilusão com as próprias análises que levam a algum tipo de autoproclamação?!
Sobre a degeneração e a liderança política esse é um tema clássico e aqui vai só um início de debate. Reconhece-se que existe liderança política e algumas atribuições facilmente identificáveis como: carisma, oratória, exemplo, dedicação, trajetória, capacidade resolutiva. Mas, quando estas características se cristalizam em uma estrutura de poder permanente?! Piorando. É quando isso se torna culto à personalidade e já não há mais volta atrás!
Vale o debate e mais ainda a preocupação.