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mashriq / arabia / iraq / imperialism / war / feature Monday January 06, 2020 20:49 byZaher Baher
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The relationship between the US and Iran has never been good after the Iranian “revolution” but since the “Arab Spring” it has gotten worse. The involvement of Iran in many countries in the Middle East, especially Iraq and Syria, made it difficult for the US to achieve its own aims in the region. This article covers what happened in Iraq currently and how the tension between the US and Iran reached a high level before the assassination of General Suleimani..

[Ελληνικά] [Castellano]

Οι σχέσεις μεταξύ ΗΠΑ και Ιράν δεν ήταν καλές μετά την Ιρανική "επανάσταση", αλλά από την "Αραβική Άνοιξη" και δώθε έχουν χειροτερέψει. Η ανάμειξη του Ιράν στα εσωτερικά πολλών χωρών της Μέσης Ανατολής, ιδίως στο Ιράκ και τη Συρία, δυσκόλεψε τις ΗΠΑ να επιτύχουν τους δικούς τους στόχους στην επανένωση. Αυτό το άρθρο καλύπτει (σχισματικά) όσα συνέβησαν στο Ιράκ και πώς η ένταση μεταξύ των ΗΠΑ και του Ιράν έφτασε σε τόσο υψηλό επίπεδο. [English] [Castellano]

Ο ανταγωνισμός μεταξύ του Ιράν και των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών για το Ιράκ

Στις 27 Δεκέμβρη 2019, μια αμερικανική βάση κοντά στο Kirkuk δέχθηκε επίθεση, σκοτώνοντας έναν Αμερικανό εργολάβο και τραυματίζοντας στρατιώτες των ΗΠΑ και του Ιράκ. Οι ΗΠΑ ισχυρίστηκαν ότι η επίθεση ξεκίνησε από μια ομάδα πολιτοφυλακής των Σιιτών, την Kata'ib Hizbullah (KH) που διάκειται φιλικά υπέρ του Ιράν.

Την Κυριακή, 29 Δεκέμβρη, οι ΗΠΑ απάντησαν με αεροπορική επίθεση εναντίον πέντε βάσεων της KH, τριών από αυτές στο Ιράκ και των υπόλοιπων στη Συρία. Η KH επιβεβαίωσε ότι 19 από τους μαχητές της σκοτώθηκαν και 35 τραυματίστηκαν. Ο αρχηγός της οργάνωσης Hashd al-Shaabi (Λαϊκές Δυνάμεις Κινητοποίησης) ανακοίνωσε αμέσως μετά ότι “Το αίμα των μαρτύρων δεν θα πάει χαμένο και η απάντησή μας θα είναι πολύ σκληρή στις αμερικανικές δυνάμεις στο Ιράκ”.

Στις 31 Δεκέμβρη, μια τεράστια διαμαρτυρία που διοργάνωσε η φιλοϊρανική πολιτοφυλακή και οι υποστηρικτές της κατέκλυσε βίαια την περιοχή της αμερικανικής πρεσβείας με τα συνθήματα “Όχι στην Αμερική!”, “Όχι, στον Trump!" και "Θάνατος στην Αμερική! "Οι διαδηλώσεις εξακολουθούν να γίνονται και η ασφάλεια του Ιράκ επέτρεψε σε μερικούς από τους διαδηλωτές να εισέλθουν στην άκρως προστατευόμενη Πράσινη Ζώνη. Η ίδια ασφάλεια, η οποία έχει καταστείλει βίαια τους διαδηλωτές στην πλατεία Tahrir στη Βαγδάτη και σε άλλες πόλεις, τώρα επέτρεψε στους διαδηλωτές και τους υποστηρικτές των φιλο-ιρανικών πολιτοφυλακών να διαδηλώσουν και να επιτεθούν με κοκτέιλ μολότοφ κατά της αμερικανικής πρεσβείας. Τα κουρδικά μέσα μαζικής ενημέρωσης ισχυρίστηκαν ότι κανένας δεν βρισκόταν στην περιοχή της πρεσβείας καθώς όλο το προσωπικό εκκένωσε τον χώρο την προηγούμενη νύχτα καταφεύγοντας στην πόλη Erbil, πρωτεύουσα της περιφερειακής κυβέρνησης του Κουρδιστάν (KRG). Αλλά οι ΗΠΑ καταγγέλλουν αυτά τα νέα ως φήμες.

Αυτό που συμβαίνει τώρα μεταξύ του Ιράν και των ΗΠΑ, δεν είναι πόλεμος. Πιστεύω ότι υπάρχει μια μικρή πιθανότητα να εκραγεί πόλεμος μεταξύ αυτών των δύο.

Η σύγκρουση μεταξύ του Ιράν και των ΗΠΑ είναι το επακολουθο της αποτυχίας των αμερικανικών εξωτερικών πολιτικών όσον αφορά το ιρανικό καθεστώς στην περιοχή της Μέσης Ανατολής. Έχει αποδειχθεί ότι οι αμερικανικές πολιτικές όχι μόνο στη Συρία και το Ιράκ, αλλά συνολικά σε ολόκληρη την περιοχή απέτυχαν, όπως συνέβη στο Αφγανιστάν και τη Λιβύη.

Αυτό που συμβαίνει τώρα μπορεί να συνεχιστεί όσο υπάρχει το σημερινό καθεστώς στο Ιράν, οπότε είναι πολύ δύσκολο για τις ΗΠΑ να επιτύχουν τους στόχους τους στην περιοχή, ιδίως στη Συρία και το Ιράκ. Το Ιράν ξέρει πώς να παίζει παιχνίδια με τις ΗΠΑ.

Η πολεμοχαρής πολιτική του Trump με το Ιράν, τη Βόρεια Κορέα και τη Ρωσία για αμφισβητούμενες χώρες ή συμφέροντα δεν βρίσκονται στο τραπέζι. Ο Trump δεν είναι τόσο αφελής όσο τα δυτικά μέσα ενημέρωσης τον απεικονίζουν. Είναι έξυπνος και ειλικρινής με την προσέγγισή του. Ο ίδιος θεωρεί ότι υπάρχουν τουλάχιστον τρεις παράγοντες που μπορεί να οδηγήσουν σε πόλεμο με το Ιράν:

Πρώτον, ο πόλεμος κατά του Αφγανιστάν, του Ιράκ και της Λιβύης ήταν ανεπιτυχής, μιας και κόστισε στις ΗΠΑ τεράστια χρηματικά ποσά και είχε ως αποτέλεσμα την απώλεια μεγάλου αριθμού Αμερικανών στρατιωτών που σκοτώθηκαν εν ώρα δράσης, τραυματίστηκαν ή έμειναν ανάπηροι. Γνωρίζει επίσης ο Trump ότι ο πόλεμος με το Ιράν δεν μπορεί να κερδηθεί, ότι θα είναι ακόμη πιο δύσκολος από τον πόλεμο στο Αφγανιστάν και το Ιράκ. Επιπλέον, υπάρχει μεγάλη πιθανότητα ο πόλεμος να εξαπλωθεί σε ολόκληρη την περιοχή. Δεν είναι σίγουρος ότι μπορεί να κερδίσει τον πόλεμο.

Δεύτερον, γνωρίζει πολύ καλά ότι ο αμερικανικός λαός εξακολουθεί να έχει κακές αναμνήσεις από πολέμους και δεν θέλει έναν άλλο πόλεμο.

Τρίτον, οι προεδρικές εκλογές έρχονται φέτος και υπάρχει η δυνατότητα να κερδίσει, οπότε δεν είναι τόσο ηλίθιος να μειώσει τις πιθανότητές του.

Όσο για τους Ιρανούς, μελέτησαν έξυπνα την νοοτροπία του Trump και την εξωτερική του πολιτική. Ξέρουν ότι ο ίδιος δεν θέλει πόλεμο μαζί τους, αλλά επίσης δεν θέλουν το Ιράκ να κυριαρχείται από τις ΗΠΑ, φοβούμενοι ότι το Ιράκ θα είναι εκτός ελέγχου. Αυτός είναι ο λόγος για τον οποίο οι Ιρανοί από καιρό σε καιρό, προωθούν άμεσα ή έμμεσα ένα είδος στρατιωτικής επιχείρησης εναντίον των ΗΠΑ ή των συμμάχων τους. Εν τω μεταξύ, το Ιράν είναι έτοιμο να προστατεύσει το ιρακινό καθεστώς με κάθε κόστος.

Αυτό που συμβαίνει στο Ιράκ τώρα, είναι προς το συμφέρον του Ιράν και όχι των ΗΠΑ. Αλλά τελικά ο ιρακινός λαός είναι που πληρώνει το τίμημα. Το Ιράν γνωρίζει ότι τα χέρια των Αμερικανών είναι δεμένα σε κάποιο βαθμό. Αυτό καθιστά δύσκολο για τις ΗΠΑ να αναγκάσουν το Ιράν να εφαρμόσει ορισμένες προϋποθέσεις που καθορίστηκαν από αυτούς. Στην πραγματικότητα, οι ΗΠΑ δεν μπορούν να σταματήσουν το Ιράν από την τρέχουσα συμπεριφορά του. Το Ιράν επίσης γνωρίζει ότι από αυτή τη σύγκρουση αναδεικνύονται μερικά σημαντικά ζητήματα. Πρώτον, η δημιουργία ενός μεγάλου χάσματος μεταξύ του ιρακινού καθεστώτος και των ΗΠΑ που όλο και διευρύνεται. Ταυτόχρονα, το Ιράν δοκιμάζει τη δύναμη και τις επιρροές του μεταξύ των φιλικών προς αυτό πολιτοφυλακών και άλλων υποστηρικτών του.

Εάν αυτή η κατάσταση συνεχιστεί, μπορεί να οξύνει τη διαμάχη μεταξύ Ιράκ και ΗΠΑ και να γίνει πραγματικό ζήτημα. Το Ιράκ δεν μπορεί να παραμείνει ουδέτερο μεταξύ του Ιράν και των ΗΠΑ απεριόριστα, όπως ισχυρίζεται τώρα. Οι ΗΠΑ δεν θα χαρούν να δουν την ιρακινή ασφάλεια να επιτρέπει στους φιλοϊρανούς και τους υποστηρικτές τους να ξεχύνονται στους δρόμους,να επιτίθενται στο ιρακινό κοινοβούλιο και να κάνουν ό,τι κάνουν εναντίον της αμερικανικής πρεσβείας. Έτσι το Ιράκ δεν έχει άλλη επιλογή παρά να διευκρινίσει τη θέση του, αν θα παραμείνει προσκολημμένο στο Ιράν ή θα υποστηρίξει τις ΗΠΑ. Κατά τη γνώμη μου, αν η κατάσταση φτάσει σε αυτό το σημείο, το Ιράκ θα υποστηρίξει το Ιράν ενάντια στις ΗΠΑ.

Δεύτερον, εάν αυτή η κατάσταση συνεχίσει, θα επηρεάσει τους διαδηλωτές στη Βαγδάτη και σε άλλες πόλεις που έχουν ήδη πληρώσει πολύ μεγάλο τίμημα μέχρι στιγμής. Πάνω από 552 άτομα έχουν σκοτωθεί, 21.000 έχουν τραυματιστεί και 25.000 έχουν συλληφθεί και κρατούνται. Επιπλέον, πολλοί περισσότεροι ακτιβιστές έχουν απαχθεί.

Σε αυτή την περίπτωση οι διαδηλωτές δεν θα έχουν άλλη επιλογή, καθώς δεν θέλουν να είναι μέρος και των δύο πλευρών, παρά να εγκαταλείψουν τα χαρακώματά τους και τους τόπους που έχουν ήδη καταλάβει.

Αυτός ο ανταγωνισμός μεταξύ του Ιράν και των ΗΠΑ για το Ιράκ δεν μπορεί να συνεχιστεί, πρέπει να επιλυθεί αργά ή γρήγορα, αλλά προς το παρόν είναι δύσκολο να προβλέψουμε πότε και πώς.

*Το κείμενο δημοσιεύτηκε στον προσωπική σελίδα του συγγραφέα στο http://Zaherbaher.com Μεταφράστηκε στα αγγλικά και δημοσιεύτηκε στο https://www.anarkismo.net/article/31713 Ελληνική μετάφραση: Ούτε Θεός-Ούτε Αφέντης.

mashriq / arabia / iraq / imperialism / war / opinion / analysis Friday December 27, 2019 23:46 byFouâd Oveisy

Turkey’s attack on Rojava forced the SDF to choose between its own survival and protecting Kurdish territories, putting the future of the revolution at risk.


I used to have this daydream. Back in 2015 I pictured myself in a free Rojava, perhaps as a teacher in a decolonized critical theory school with colleagues who fought in the Syrian civil war and led the feminist revolution in Rojava.

In this dream my students and I read Abdullah Öcalan together and argued fiercely but comradely over the future of the revolution. Beyond the classroom’s windows, I could see Afrin’s mountainous landscapes.

In this dream, I would occasionally think back on the friends and lovers, credit cards companies and well-intentioned racists, and even the meaningless jobs and alienated citizens of the capitalist metropolises that I had left behind forever.

In this dream I had no regrets.

By 2015 the revolution in Rojava had withstood the test of time and averted catastrophe, despite all odds stacked against it. Many leftists and revolutionaries across the globe had come to view it as an enduring, Middle East-changing, radically democratic political alternative. The legendary People’s and Women’s Protection Units (the YPG and YPJ) had driven the forces of the Islamic State (ISIS) out of Kobanî with the help of coalition air support.

The staunch and militant feminist–anarchist experiment was forging ahead. Internationalist volunteers were traveling to the region to help with the ecological projects and join the escalating war against ISIS. Rojava was no utopia but it persisted in a time out of time like few other places.

After ISIS was forced out of Rojava, the late 2015 transformation of the YPG into the United States-sponsored Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) heralded the beginning of a new era, one that culminated in removing ISIS from its last bastion in Bāghūz in early 2019. By then Turkey and its jihadi proxies had invaded Afrin; its local YPG forces were not part of the US–SDF agreement and could not defend the area on their own against NATO’s second largest army.

Elsewhere in Rojava, the grassroots work of the ecological and women’s movements carried on, but, as witnessed during the defense of Afrin, the revolution’s political and strategic decision-making was increasingly centralized in the SDF and according to the priorities of its cooperation with the US. Retooled and rebranded to wage war against ISIS, the SDF’s rise to dominance coincided with the reproduction of state institutions inside anti-state Rojava, in order to meet the logistical demands of a historic military campaign that no other force in the region had the will to carry out.

With Turkey’s attack on Rojava in October of 2019 came the risk that the SDF would choose its own institutional survival over the core mission of defending the revolution’s original enclaves along the Syria–Turkey border. The Americans had exploited Turkish phobias as well as the SDF’s strengths and weaknesses as a vanguard political class to force it into this double bind. The dream of a free and autonomous Rojava was in danger.

THE ROJAVA (COUNTER-)REVOLUTION

The formation of the SDF was in part a response to Turkey’s role in sponsoring the rise of ISIS as a proxy to eliminate the Kurdish populations in northern Iraq and Syria. Until then, the US had sponsored an inefficient and anti-Kurdish Syrian opposition and was in no rush to change course. After the Russians entered the Syrian civil war in 2016, the Americans could no longer afford to back a losing side.

The SDF’s plan was to eliminate ISIS in its entirety in order to nullify Turkish efforts to use the group as an anti-Kurdish proxy in the region. If Turkey was to attack Rojava from the north and ISIS resurged from the south, the consequences would be catastrophic. ISIS control over the oil-rich Deir ez-Zor province in eastern Syria also bankrolled the group’s armies in Iraq and Syria.

However, the necessities of this offensive required further militarization of society and the economy, and the centralization and consolidation of strategic decision-making power in military organs connected to the US, i.e. the SDF. This new status raised the security profile of the YPG, the leftist and majority Kurdish backbone of the SDF, which Turkey deems “terrorists.”

Turkey exploited the pretext of alleged “Kurdish domination” in northern Syria and executed a multi-step containment strategy to dissect, isolate and eliminate Rojava’s autonomy.

Turkey’s offensive began in 2016 with the expansion of Operation Euphrates Shield into north Syria to separate the cantons of Afrin and Kobanî. The occupation and ethnic cleansing of the isolated Afrin canton followed in 2018. The September 2019 “safe zone” agreement between Turkey and the Trump administration envisioned a 30 kilometer–deep, 120 kilometer–wide strip at the Rojava–Turkey border “cleared” of the YPG and its defense structures. This zone separates the cantons of Kobanî and Jazira.

Weeks later, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan climbed the podium of the United Nations General Assembly and promised to resettle the three million Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey in this zone. The SDF responded by ceding a strategic five-kilometer stretch of the proposed “safe zone” to Turkey as a buffer area, but this compromise only led to a temporary and staged withdrawal of the US military from northeast Syria. With its defenses dismantled, the YPG was in no position for a sustained resistance across the border, against common US and Turkish interests in Syria.

The following week the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and its jihadi mercenaries embarked on a campaign of bombing and looting towns and villages in Rojava, displacing 400,000 people in the process. So far, 350 civilians have been killed and countless more wounded. Shortly after the fall of the key border towns of Serê Kaniyê (Ras al-Ayn) and Geri Spi (Tell Abyad), SDF commander Mazlum Abdi brokered the surrender of Rojava to the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

Assad’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA) moved into areas under attack and together with the SDF they defended the north for a few days until Mike Pence brokered a “ceasefire” deal in Ankara. The US–Turkey agreement ordered the SDF to retreat 30 kilometers from the border and was violated from the get-go through Turkish chemical warfare. The SDF retreated from the border per instructions and resumed calls for the US to stay in Syria. Erdoğan then agreed on another permanent ceasefire, this time with Vladimir Putin. Shortly after, the Americans returned to northern Syria after a hiatus spanning the time between the first Turkish attack and the Russian brokered ceasefire. In facilitating the piecemeal surrender of Rojava to Assad and Turkey, the US had managed to severely undermine the autonomy of the only leftist administration in the Middle East in just two weeks.

Rojava found itself in this situation because the US foreign policy strategy of both Trump and Obama before him was to craft a careful counterrevolution in Rojava. Arming and transforming the SDF into an “anti-ISIS” instrument was central to this atrocious strategy. The alliance with the SDF enabled the US to become a powerbroker in Syria, with less than 1,000 American “boots on the ground.” Once the Americans set up bases anywhere in the world, as they did in 21 different locations in Rojava, not a single army in the world can muster up the audacity to force them out. The specter of an empowered SDF also served as an American stick to contain and steer Turkey’s pivot to Russia. The SDF’s growing power alarmed the Turkish army’s top brass increasingly and prioritized militancy over diplomacy in Rojava.

This vicious cycle ultimately forced the SDF into a decisive war with Turkey. The Americans’ last options were always going to be between sponsoring Rojava’s reintegration into Syria at the expense of US interests (a nonstarter) and guaranteeing Rojava’s independence from Syria (a nonstarter for Turkey). This was a contradiction that the US cultivated and harvested because Turkey could better serve American interests in the region after it sidelined the SDF, because the Americans were never going to withdraw from Syria and never planned to lose key ground in Syria to the Russians either.

Indeed, during the week of the Turkish invasion Washington think tanks murmured quietly about the inevitability of the SDF’s retreat to a region south of Rojava — the Arab-majority area known as the middle Euphrates river valley. Things did not go as planned, but once the US foreign policy machine had fully reacted to the SDF–Assad pact, a so-called reverse course strategy was drawn up (as plan B) to push the revolutionary SDF to reconstitute itself as a Kurdish–led, Arab–majority proxy in the middle Euphrates river valley. While initially refusing this role, the SDF eventually decided that a US presence in the middle Euphrates river valley would counterbalance Russia and Assad’s newfound foothold in Kurdish Rojava.

With its defense forces exiled from Rojava and resettled for now in predominantly Arab eastern Syria, the fate of the revolution in Rojava after the SDF’s de facto banishment from Rojava hangs in the brute balance of imperialist interests.

THE DOMINO EFFECT

As I write, demographic engineering of the Turkish-occupied “safe zone” is well underway. The regime forces and Russian military police patrol the enclaves of Kobanî and Qamishli on either side of the zone. Per Trump’s tweets, the Americans are “securing the oil” as a smokescreen for securing the Syria–Iraq border and obstructing Russia’s land access to Iraq and the Gulf region. Iran, Iraq and Lebanon are shaking with protests and the Iran hawks are hedging their bets in Syria, which is Iran’s land bridge to Lebanon and Israel. Maintaining this land bridge also enables Iran to mobilize its interlinked regional proxies for different aims, such as the coup against the 2017 independence referendum in Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

Withholding oil revenues from Damascus through supervising Trump’s so-called petroleum venture serves as the SDF’s double-edged sword for securing its own and Rojava’s future. Because Assad needs oil to reconstruct Syria after the civil war, he will be tactful with rolling back freedoms in the Kurdish areas that are now under his control again. And if he does not play along, the SDF might clone the US–sponsored autonomy of the KRG, this time in Syria’s middle Euphrates river valley.

On the downside, the SDF is more reliant on the Americans than ever. The US and France are pushing the SDF to improve relations with the neoliberal Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in charge of the KRG. The idea is to re-functionalize economic and logistical supply lines through Iraq, in exchange for giving the Kurdish National Council (ENKS), the KDP’s Syrian sibling, a role in the administration of areas surrendered to Assad. The KDP and ENKS are on good terms with both the US and Turkey and will work to roll back the radical aspects of the revolution in Rojava to appease all concerned parties.

The loss of Rojava was also bad news for the Kurdistan Workers Party’s (PKK) headquarters in the Qandil Mountains in northeast Iraq, because it meant a restriction of their access to escape routes and recruiting grounds in Kurdish Syria. The Turkish army has been gearing up to finish off the PKK’s old guard and liquidate its check on Erdoğan’s hostility toward the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the political wing of the Kurdish resistance movement in Turkey. Without the PKK’s armed specter, the HDP’s minoritarian parliamentary politics will not last long in Turkey’s militarized, pan-Turkist, and increasingly religious democracy. Choosing between survival and irrelevance, Qandil ditched its earlier position against the Syrian Kurds ceding their lands to the occupiers and even toned-down its understandable hostility toward its old right wing nemesis, the KDP.

All in all, it appears that the leftist Kurdish resistance movement is cornered by imperialism, at least for the time being. The SDF will retain its numbers by working with the US and postpones a definitive settlement with Assad. Maintaining American presence in the middle Euphrates river valley prolongs the deadlock in north Syria and enables the SDF to retain the control of Syria’s border with Iraq, in order to force the possibility of ending the war with Turkey on the SDF’s terms. The PKK may leverage the borrowed time and wiggle room to encourage a peace process in Turkey.

If the SDF times the Americans’ eventual exit from Syria with shifting its allegiance to the Russians, it might be able to extend its lifeline as a proxy force in central Syria and keep both Assad and the ENKS from meddling too much in Rojava. Signs of recent rapprochement with the Russians are encouraging, but making such a transition is difficult for reasons that follow later in this analysis.

One way or another, the revolutionary phase in Rojava has come to an end because the SDF opted to retain its military institutions, as opposed to mounting a decisive resistance against the Turkish-led invasion. Four years into the era of Rojava’s war against ISIS I mourn the loss of Kurdish land and yet another displacement of the Kurds. I mourn the revolutionaries I admired and civilian lives lost to the daily violence of Turkey’s settler-colonial scheme. I mourn a daydream that no longer comforts me. Abandoning Kurdish land and people is not in the spirit of a Kurdish resistance movement and the SDF has confronted its revolutionary base with a fait accompli.

However, it is in such moments that there is a choice to be made between abandoning a dream and fealty to an event of Rojava’s magnitude. With two imperialist forces as watchdogs and with the likes of Assad and ENKS as rivals, I see a resilient and civilian praxis of dual power as the radical way forward for saving the utopian remnants of the revolution in Rojava. The SDF is instrumental to safeguarding these remnants in this context — if it evolves to become more than the revolution’s military command.

In order to envision this radical future we must take a detour through the Rojava revolution’s origins in the early years of the PKK and the thought of Abdullah Öcalan or “Apo,” as he is affectionately known by his followers, the movement’s intellectual uncle and strategic mastermind.

PLAYING THE GRAMSCIAN GAME

The Kurdish resistance movement is marked by the contradiction that, as Gramsci put it in The Prison Notebooks — The Modern Prince, “whatever one does one is always playing somebody’s game.” In view of this inevitability Gramsci advises: “The important thing is to seek in every way to play one’s own game with success.” The YPG and SDF’s forebears in the PKK turned Gramsci’s motto into political artistry, in order to lay the foundations of their political hegemony in the four corners of Kurdistan.

For example, women were part in the founding of, and fighting for the PKK. But in addition to empowering women, the recruit of women into to the PKK’s ranks was to recognize patriarchy as an obstacle to the political success of the organization. The Turkish military armed and co-opted conservative Kurdish tribes in its war against the PKK, and since guerrilla war against Kurdish tribalism could not be avoided, the feminists in the PKK deployed women’s emancipation as a tool of destroying Kurdish tribalism, which had traditionally placed women at the bottom of the tribal hierarchy. Kurdish patriarchy prevented political recruitment and the military hegemony necessary for the emergence of a new society in which women would take part equally. Ethical and effective organization fused in this savvy strategy.

Fast-forward to 2015, when the women of the PKK and YPJ liberated the Yezidis enslaved by ISIS in Iraq’s Shingal. The battle itself, the grief of the guerrillas upon arriving in Shingal, and the Yezidi women’s joy after liberation is the stuff of legends. But by expelling ISIS from Shingal, the YPG regained control of highways in Iraq that served as major supply routes to ISIS strongholds in Syria. And with this control also came the ability to circumvent the Turkish commercial embargo on Rojava, which Turkey exerted through commercial highways controlled by its unholy ally, the KDP. In other words, at one stroke the YPG–PKK tandem liberated the Yezidis from ISIS and Rojava’s economy from its Turkish yoke. This ingenious strategy provides, in theorizing a revolutionary Kurdish realpolitik, a blueprint that is equally moral and strategic.

The danger in this Gramscian game is that one might become too prone to playing another’s game. The 2015 formation of the SDF was characterized by a systematic and celebrated inclusion of Arab, Armenian and Syriac forces, among others, alongside the mainly Kurdish YPG. In June 2019, local SDF military councils were set up all over northeast Syria to decentralize its defense forces, in what appeared to be a second revolution in Rojava. Like all other PKK–YPG stratagems there was, behind the SDF’s genuine ethical pluralism, a clever and long-term political move.

Months later, once the Syrian army and Russian military police were deployed in Rojava after the Turkey–Russia ceasefire, it was apparent that Putin and Assad were exercising uncharacteristic patience with continued SDF presence in these areas. They acted with restraint because of the SDF’s military councils. No matter the regime forces’ expansion throughout northeast Syria under the terms of the SDF–Assad deal, the regime forces were stretched too thinly to really threaten the SDF’s military councils, as they add up to about 100,000 men and women distributed in independent local units in a region the size of Denmark. The SDF leveraged this imbalance of forces to ward off Assad hostility toward the revolutions’ politicians and civilians, especially in the abandoned Kurdish regions.

All the same, the SDF’s pluralist realpolitik did not stop the US or Turkey from taking advantage. The US “reverse course” strategy forced the YPG to choose between staying in charge of the SDF or being replaced piecemeal with the localized Arab military councils.

Manned by Sunni tribes in former ISIS strongholds such as Deir ez-Zor, these councils prefer American patronage to Assad’s return. Indeed, Arab forces make up 60 percent of all SDF forces and not all of them share the YPG’s cherished leftist beliefs. Ultimately the YPG was forced to choose the survival of the SDF as an institution in eastern Syria, over defending the revolution back in Rojava.

This is the same YPG/YPJ that a decade before the onset of the Syrian and Rojava revolutions carried out the underground work to educate the urban and rural Syrian Kurds on the tenets of Öcalan’s democratic confederalism and democratic autonomy. Such has been the cunning of history and US foreign policy.

APO VERSUS UNCLE SAM

Öcalan’s ideological frameworks of democratic confederalism and democratic autonomy prescribed the means to civilizing war amid a civil war. The idea behind this hybrid framework was to skillfully play the Gramscian game — by overturning the gameboard.

The framework was the product of Öcalan’s reflections on his mistakes in over four decades of resisting Turkish colonialism and militarism. As the PKK’s leader, Öcalan’s politics in the decades prior to the experiment in Rojava were aimed at reinvigorating the recognition of the Kurdish identity in the Middle East and establishing a Kurdish nation-state by decolonizing Turkey’s Kurdish areas. But Öcalan realized that as a postcolonial movement in a postcolonial region, the Kurdish resistance movement could not wage a war for international recognition against recently postcolonial states such as Syria and Iraq.

In the first place, since Kurdistan is divided into four parts, a resistance movement in one colonized part of Kurdistan is treated as regional war against four state enemies. The size and number of these wars and enemies often surpass the strategic capacities of Kurdish resistance movements. This strategic deficit is exacerbated because Kurdish resistance movements find no allies outside Kurdistan. The Kurds’ state enemies wield a monopoly over the production of the postcolonial discourse within their territories, which they use to mobilize genuine anti-imperialist sentiments in the region as testament to their territorial sovereignty. This is a discourse that attracts the international and postcolonial left and produces a political recognition of postcolonial state sovereignty as an end in itself. However, this recognition often comes at the expense of misrecognizing genuine minoritarian movements within these postcolonial states as “imperialist” vehicles for destabilizing national and postcolonial independence.

Against this distorted backdrop, a radical change in the Middle Eastern politics of assigning meaning to land was a matter of strategic necessity. Öcalan’s late theories reinvest the melancholy of stateless movements for sovereignty in a desire for egalitarian redistribution of power, where power and legitimacy come not through recognition by the international state system but through living in common and away from the state and its territorial logic.

Rojava’s implementation of Öcalan’s theories translated into practical advantages in the Syrian civil war. Working within the stateless framework of democratic autonomy, the Syrian Kurds were not ideologically and strategically mandated to seek independence from the Syrian Arab Republic as Kurds, saving themselves from Bashar Assad’s butcheries throughout the civil war. The Syrian Kurds’ democratic confederalist approach to sharing power made them attractive to the region’s other minorities, and the powersharing inoculated these minorities against the overtures of the region’s other sectarian actors in Iran, Iraq and Turkey. If the contradictions of sectarian war could not be avoided, Rojava deployed those contradictions against sectarianism.

However, Öcalan’s frameworks were designed for a gradual transformation of life and politics in Syria and the Middle East over many decades — and the Americans were aware of this limitation. Their push for the SDF’s aggressive southward expansion forced the surrounding states actors to rally around common interests threatened by the US–SDF alliance, and the mounting regional hostility only increased Rojava’s reliance on the US for protection. As Mazlum Kobanî professed in 2017, “the main reason that our relations with Turkey broke down…is the strategic relationship that developed between us and the United States. This aggravated Turkey’s phobias, its fears.”

The increasing role of the US in Rojava also heightened the hostility of the surrounding nation-states’ leftist blocks and strengthened the perception of the revolution in Rojava as a “Kurdish-led,” “American-sponsored” project to “divide the Middle East,” stunting the revolution’s regional appeal and influence.

The SDF’s own class dynamics as a military vanguard facilitated this vicious dynamic between reliance and isolation. The SDF suffered from a crisis of legitimacy in northeast Syria after the rapid southward expansion into the conservative and tribal middle Euphrates river valley. The Arab militias that formed the majority of the SDF were mostly tribal and their allegiance to the SDF was geared around tactical alliances made possible by continued American presence in Rojava.

Meanwhile in Rojava, the YPG and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), never enjoyed political hegemony. Despite their growing popularity and hegemony, many Syrian Kurds remained conservative and trusting of the ENKS. As for the important members of the Syriac and Armenian communities, they constitute the traditional bourgeoisie of the Rojava region and their interests were subject to the maintenance of their class interests. Managing the escalating threats of ISIS and Turkey allowed the SDF to manufacture hegemony in this new climate.

The territorial logic of these wars, and the logistical necessities imposed on Rojava’s politics by territoriality, undermined the capacities of democratic confederalism and democratic autonomy for countering the centralizing tendencies of the state. Centralization of the revolution in its military command facilitated the US priorities in the region and rolled back on Rojava’s program of civilizing war. Culturally, the radical imaginary of a revolution that had set itself the task of ending war in the Middle East by changing men was reduced, through the dictates of the US-led strategy, to that of a security instrument that saw ISIS as nemesis and dialectical other.

It is only understandable that the traumas and sacrifices of battles against ISIS and the Turkish army and its proxies have congealed, in Rojava’s popular imaginary, into a collective drive to prevent such catastrophes in the future. ISIS was and is no specter or excuse for war but a real enemy of all Middle Eastern people and women. But this is also an anxiety that reinforced the mandate of the SDF to protect the region by all means necessary, as well as the US coalitions’ narrative to “defeat terror.” From behind the scenes, despite appearing to support Rojava’s war of position in Syria, the Americans had in fact been wielding a corrosive war of maneuver.

ROJAVA AFTER ROJAVA

The alternative to US-sponsored autonomy was a return to life under Assad, in whom the lineage of apartheid against Syria’s Kurds culminates. Rojava’s dream scenario was a peace agreement between the PKK and Turkey mediated by Öcalan, to ease Turkish pressure from across the border. The nightmare scenario was the Turkish occupation of Rojava. Between these scenarios, the second was as impossible as the other two were dreadful. Knowing this, the US, Turkey, Russia, Assad and Iran all took part in the same atrocious approach: forcing Rojava into difficult situations where its civil and military leadership was forced to prioritize and centralize power to defend Rojava.

This imperialist strategy aggravated the disjunction between “Bookchinizing” life inside Rojava and the Marxist-realist approach of the SDF to what might be called Rojava’s foreign policy. The revolutionary work at the grassroots in Rojava continues unimpeded, but it is increasingly excluded from the SDF’s decision-making processes.

Disconnecting the grassroots from decision-making processes led to the popular perception that working with the Americans was necessary to extract constitutional concessions from Assad, when in reality the Americans only discouraged the SDF from entering the peace process. Along with Iran, Turkey and Russia, the Americans also excluded Rojava from the UN-sponsored talks regarding Syria’s constitution.

Assad’s difficulties in conquering opposition-held villages in the Idlib province were a clear sign that he might refrain from testing the military might of the 100,000 strong SDF. Had the SDF negotiated with the regime from a position of strength well before the Turkish assault, the prospect of retaining an autonomous local militia to protect the political administration in Rojava would have been a strong possibility.

Critically, the current dynamics of the stalemate between Assad and SDF are not irreversible. Cracks might emerge in the SDF’s hegemony in the middle Euphrates river valley if the Middle East’s biggest tribes that are based there resume calls for reconciliation with Assad. And if the Russians become less tolerant of the SDF’s alliance with the US, they might choose to weaken the SDF by using Kobanî as leverage in a future deal with Turkey, and by replacing local councils aligned with the YPG and SDF in the border areas.

If they manage to fully control the city of Ayn Issa, where the headquarters of the SDF’s political wing the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) are located, the Russians might also try to encourage an equally weary SDC to split. In any event, the international left’s loyalty should remain with those who stay behind to defend the revolution’s remnants in order to organize for its next phase; to create “a democratic system for all Syrian peoples and spreading this model to all of Syria,” in the words of the SDC’s Fawza Youssef. Bonding with Syria’s sidelined Sunni opposition remains the most challenging and strategic, but rewarding task for the revolutionaries in Rojava.

Turkey will push to extend its stay and the territory under its control in northern Syria for as long the US–SDF partnership continues, in order to force the SDF to further rely on the US and so to prevent the development of an understanding between the regime and the SDF. But while the US troops will stay in the Deir ez-Zor and al-Tanf bases in eastern Syria for the foreseeable future to keep Russia and Assad in check — securing oil or no oil — the Americans will remain hawkish in northern Syria and across the border with Iraq, for as long as the Islamic Republic remains defiant. It is likely that a reconciliation between Iran and the US-led neoliberal world order is on the horizon, rather than further isolation and sanctions.

The removal of fuel subsidies — which sparked the last round of Iran protests — is likely part of a larger program of surgical austerity politics in Iran that prepares the country’s rentier state economy for the deregulated “free market.” The SDF’s window of opportunity to find an alternative to American patronage, and to prepare the self-administration and civil society in Rojava for Assad’s return, is between now and such a transition in Iran. The situation in Syria is too unpredictable to speculate beyond this point.

Iran’s impending transition to neoliberal legitimacy — marking the end of an era of rogue states — and the tightening of the international state system’s chokehold on the Kurdish resistance movement’s different manifestations should serve as a wakeup call and reality check for the SDC/SDF tandem. They must evolve culturally and strategically to navigate the new climate in Syria; it is time for another revolution in Rojava.

For example, the recent drop in expressions of international solidarity with Rojava, which previously won Rojava its media war against the Turkish occupation, is a reminder that Rojava inspires global solidarity insofar as it retains the alternative discourse and third-way politics inspired by Öcalan’s politics. The drop in solidarity was partly due to the SDF/SDC’s parroting of the neoliberal discourse of establishment politicians in capitalist metropolises. If the SDF/SDC has no choice but to engage such politicians in dialogue, Rojava’s leaders should respond from the mantle of revolutionary polemicists.

The drop in expressions of international solidarity was also related to the opacity of SDF/SDC’s decision-making process, not only vis-à-vis the grassroots in Rojava but also towards external allies who might reconsider their support for a revolutionary vanguard that makes little effort to communicate its true aims and intentions.

To address this deficit, the top down hierarchy between strategic and tactical decision making in Rojava should be reversed: the grassroots should decide on long-term decisions and leaders on the temporal tactics pertaining to collective decisions on strategy. The idea is to educate the next generation of grassroots revolutionaries on the art and science of strategy and, to that extent, open up and democratize the space and possibilities of effective international solidarity to everyone. These are no easy tasks to accomplish in an enclave occupied by Turkey and controlled by no lesser evils than Iran, Russia, Assad and the United States. But the most commendable aspect of the Rojava project was always the utopian will to push the boundaries of the politically possible.

I conclude my reflections at this critical juncture in the life of the leftist resistance movement in Rojava and wider Kurdistan, which, as its mantra goes, never stops resisting. But I also believe it is time for the Kurdish resistance movement to shed its resistant stance and impose its own will and necessities on the Middle Eastern disarray.

Such a proactive approach does not require an offensive war of position in the name of survival or war on terror. It entails returning to the groundbreaking capacities of Öcalan’s dual-power framework of democratic confederalism and democratic autonomy, by way of theorizing and redeveloping these capacities for sustained, effective, and democratic self-defense against capitalist and imperialist counterrevolution.

In Öcalan and the PKK’s games of organization, war and morality, and in the lessons of Rojava’s bittersweet legacy, we find the counter-counterrevolutionary blueprints for a Kurdish and leftist realpolitik.

mashriq / arabia / iraq / imperialism / war / non-anarchist press Saturday November 09, 2019 18:08 byRobert Fisk

That wars end very differently to our own expectations – or our plans – was established long ago. That “we” won the Second World War did not mean the Americans would win the Vietnam war, or that France would vanquish its enemies in Algeria. Yet the moment we decide who the good guys are, and who the evil monsters whom we must destroy, we relapse again into our old mistakes.

Because we hate, loathe and demonise Saddam or Gaddafi or Assad, we are sure – we are absolutely convinced – that they will be dethroned and that the blue skies of freedom will shine down upon their broken lands. This is childish, immature, infantile (although, given the trash we are prepared to consume over Brexit, it’s not, I suppose, very surprising).

Well, Saddam’s demise brought upon Iraq the most unimaginable suffering. So too Gaddafi’s assassination beside the most famous sewer in Libya. As for Bashar al-Assad, far from being overthrown, he has emerged as the biggest winner of the Syrian war. Still we insist that he must go. Still we intend to try Syrian war criminals – and rightly so – but the Syrian regime has emerged above the blood-tide of war intact, alive, and with the most reliable superpower ally any Middle East state could have: the Kremlin.

I despise the word “curate”. Everyone seems to be curating scenarios, curating political conversations or curating business portfolios. We seem to be addicted to these awful curio words. But for once I’m going to use it in real form: those who curated the story – the narrative – of the Syrian war, got it all wrong from the start.

Bashar would go. The Free Syrian Army, supposedly made up of tens of thousands of Syrian army deserters and the unarmed demonstrators of Darayya, Damascus and Homs, would force the Assad family from power. And, of course, western-style democracy would break out, and secularism – which was in fact supposed to be the foundation of the Baath party – would become the basis of a new and liberal Arab state. We shall leave aside for now one of the real reasons for the west’s support of the rebellion: to destroy Iran’s only Arab ally.

We didn’t predict the arrival of al-Qaeda, now purified with the name of Nusrah. We did not imagine that the Isis nightmare would emerge like a genie from the eastern deserts. Nor did we understand – nor were we told – how these Islamist cults could consume the people’s revolution in which we believed.

Still today, I am only beginning to learn how Syria’s “moderate” rebellion turned into the apocalyptic killing machine of the Islamic State. Some Islamist groups (not all, by any means, and it was not a simple transition) were there from the start. They were in Homs as early as 2012.

This does not mean that Syrian rebels were not brave, democratically minded figures. But they were mightily exaggerated in the west. While David Cameron was fantasising about the 70,000 Free Syrian Army (FSA) “moderates” fighting the Assad regime – there were never more than perhaps 7,000, at the most – the Syrian army was already talking to them, sometimes directly by mobile phone, to persuade them to return to their original government army units or to abandon a town without fighting or to swap the bodies of government soldiers for food. Syrian officers would say that they always preferred to fight the FSA because they ran away; Nusrah and Isis did not.

Yet now, today, as we report the results of the Turkish invasion of northern Syria, we are using a weird expression for Turkey’s Arab militia allies. They are called the “Syrian National Army” – as opposed to the Assad government’s original and still very extant Syrian Arab Army. Vincent Durac, a professor in Middle East politics in Dublin, even wrote last week that these Arab militia allies were “a creation of Turkey”.

This is nonsense. They are the wreckage of the original and now utterly discredited Free Syrian Army – David Cameron’s mythical legions whose mysterious composition, I recall, was once explained to British MPs by the gloriously named General Messenger. Very few reporters (with the honourable exception of those reporting for Channel 4 News) have explained this all-important fact of the war, even though some footage clearly showed the Turkish-paid militiamen brandishing the old Free Syrian Army green, white and black flag.

It was this same ex-FSA rabble who entered the Kurdish enclave of Afrin last year and helped their Nusrah colleagues loot Kurdish homes and businesses. The Turks called this violent act of occupation “Operation Olive Branch”. Even more preposterous, its latest invasion is named “Operation Peace Spring”.

There was a time when this would have provoked ribaldry and contempt. No longer. Today, the media have largely treated this ridiculous nomenclature with something approaching respect.

We have been playing the same tricks with the so-called “American-backed” Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As I’ve said before, almost all the SDF are Kurds, and they have never been elected, chosen, or joined the SDF democratically. Indeed there was nothing at all democratic about the militia, and its “force” existed only so long as it was supported by US air power. Yet the Syrian Democratic Forces kept their title unscathed and largely unquestioned by the media.

But when the Turks invaded Syria, to drive them from the Syrian-Turkish border, they were suddenly transformed by us into “Kurdish forces” – which they largely were – who had been betrayed by the Americans – which they very definitely were.

An irony, which is either forgotten or simply unknown, is that when fighting began in Aleppo in 2012, the Kurds helped the FSA grab several areas of the city. The two were fighting each other seven years later when the Turks invaded the “free” Kurdish borderland of Rojava. Even less advertised was the fact that the Turkish-FSA advance into Syria allowed thousands of Arab Syrian villagers to return to homes taken over by the Kurds when they set up their doomed statelet after the war began.

But the narrative of this war is now being further skewed by our suspension of any critical understanding of Saudi Arabia’s new role in the Syrian debacle.

Deny and deny and deny is the Saudi policy, when asked what assistance it gave to the anti-Assad Islamist rebels in Syria. Even when I found Bosnian weapons documents in a Nusrah base in Aleppo, signed off by an arms manufacturer near Sarajevo called Ifet Krnjic – and even when I tracked down Krnjic himself, who explained how the weapons had been sent to Saudi Arabia (he even described the Saudi officials whom he spoke to in his factory) – the Saudis denied the facts.

Yet today, almost incredibly, it seems the Saudis themselves are now contemplating an entirely new approach to Syria. Already their United Arab Emirates allies in the Yemeni war (another Saudi catastrophe) have reopened their embassy in Damascus: a highly significant decision by the Gulf state, although largely ignored in the west. Now, it seems, the Saudis are thinking of strengthening their cooperation with Russia by financing, along with the Emiratis and perhaps also Kuwait, the reconstruction of Syria.

Thus the Saudis would become more important to the Syrian regime than sanctions-cracked Iran, and would perhaps forestall Qatar’s own increasingly warm – if very discreet – relations with Bashar al-Assad. The Qataris, despite their Al-Jazeera worldwide empire, want to expand their power over real, physical land; and Syria is an obvious target for their generosity and wealth. But if the Saudis decided to take on this onerous role, the kingdom would at one and the same time muscle both Iran and Qatar aside. Or so it believes. The Syrians – whose principle policy in such times is to wait, and wait, and wait – will, of course, decide how to play with their neighbours’ ambitions.

But Saudi interest in Syria is not merely conjecture. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman remarked to Time magazine in August last year that “Bashar is going to stay. But I believe that Bashar’s interest is not to let the Iranians do whatever they want to do.” The Syrians and the Bahrainis are talking regularly about the post-war Levant. The Emirates might even negotiate between the Saudis and the Syrians. The Gulf states are now saying that it was a mistake to suspend Syria’s membership of the Arab League.

In other words, Syria – with Russian encouragement – is steadily resuming the role it maintained before the 2011 revolt.

This wasn’t what we in the west imagined then, when our ambassadors in Damascus were encouraging the Syrian street demonstrators to keep up their struggle against the regime; indeed, when they specifically told the protestors not even to talk or negotiate with the Assad government.

But those were in the days before two crazed elements emerged to smash all our assumptions, sowing fear and distrust across the Middle East: Donald Trump and Isis.
mashriq / arabia / iraq / imperialism / war / press release Tuesday October 22, 2019 19:16 byKAF

We are against the war, but we support and defending people against the attacks that they face. We offer our solidarity towards those facing invasion and repression.


Our solidarity outside of Turkey and Syria is continual boycott of the Turkish Products and Tourism

We are against any war and any states who launches war on another country including the current war against Rojava (North East of Syria) by the state of Turkey. It is our principle along with the non-Kurdish who support Rojava and do whatever we can against the state of Turkey and its regional and international allies.

War not only causes death, displacement and destruction; in fact it is a large investment and is necessary for the circulation of capital and diverting people’s attention from whatever current crisis. War does not just bring the death of people and destroying of their society; it revives and creates nationalism, fascism, and racism. War displaces population on a massive scale and changes the demography of the regions; it also changes the struggles between the political parties over power to a war between the ethnicities in the countries and the regions. War is destroying human identities and making people temporary forgetting their immediate problems. In the war, the more vulnerable people such as women, children, elderly, disabled and people with special needs are the first to be victims of war.

The war in Rojava is not just the war of (the grey wolves) of Turkey. In fact it is also the power struggle of the powerful forces of the United States and Russia, to gain the bigger piece of the cake of the eight years’ war in Syria. Moreover, it is the war of the reactionary religion and the religious against development and enlightenment. Generally, war is also about the parliamentary system and the united tribes of bourgeoisie together in the world.

The war on Rojava is the attempt of exporting the economic, social, and politics crisis of Erdogan’s government and its allies. It is a tool to suppress the libertarians’ voices in Turkey, like the voices in Taksim Square and inside the prisons, on streets, in factories and neighbourhoods against the state of Turkey.

In the face of the states and the military attacks on Rojava, the world is silent and blinded, we the people who struggle against it can offer the solidarity to Rojava by marching on the street, collect basic items to the victims of the war, boycotting all the goods produced in Turkey. We believe fighting the state of Turkey economically is the revolutionary weapon; boycotting in every ways possible will have a major effect on the Turkish economy.

We a group of libertarian people agreed to get together through our social relationships and our contacts to stand up against nationalists, nationalism, racism, bigotry, discrimination, chauvinists, class superiority and capitalism. We participate actively in the boycott campaign of any goods from Turkey and Turkish shops in the locality to where we live. We also boycott holidays in Turkey, travelling to/from or through Turkey by air, sea and road.

We call upon those people who agree with us to join us to make our campaign stronger and more effective.

No to war, no to invasion and the government, no to the class system.

No to being silent in the face of aggression and repression.

Yes to cooperation with people suffering.

Yes towards boycotting any goods from Turkey and travelling through or holidays to Turkey.

Yes towards anti-national unity and solidarity against war, repression and suppression.

Libertarians Dialogue Group
www.facebook.com/groups/AZADIXUAZAN

Kurdish-speaking Anarchist Forum (KAF)
www.facebook.com/ANARKISTAN

19th October 2019

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