The Bolivia’s Lessons:the proletariat in pre-revolutionary situation

bolivia / peru / ecuador / chile | workplace struggles | opinion / analysis Friday June 17, 2005 22:54 by UNIPA - UNIPA/Brasil unipa_net at yahoo dot com dot br

Official Report of the UNIPA (Anarchist Popular Union) # number º08 - Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June of 2005

"To the Bolivian people;
To the militants of the Brazilian and Latin-Americans social movements.
To the revolutionary companions all over the world."

The initiated political crisis in May of 2005 in Bolivia walk toward making a pre-revolutionary's situation. The masses popular mobilizations culminated with the fence of the capital (La Paz) for the masses movements, with the blockade of the main highways of the country (paralyzing the circulation of commodities and the economy) and president's Carlos Mesa renouncement; then with attacks to the National Congress of the Country, during the impasse generated by the presidential succession.
A theoretical analysis of one more political crisis in Bolivia is necessary. This political crisis in Bolivia comes inside of a cycle of crises provoked by the adjustment of the Latin-American countries to the liberal economical regimes, imposed by the international imperialism. The case of Bolivia is to give two important lessons to the international proletariat: 1st) the first lesson that the Bolivian people teach is us the one of the possibility of popular resistance the liberal reforms and reversion of certain unfavorable measures to the people, imposed by the bourgeois forces and their allied ones, through the direct action of masses, of the strikes and street fights; 2nd) second lesson, its tells respect the limitations that a masses movement without a revolutionary direction guided by clear and very defined program and theory.
The Bolivian people demonstrate to be a warlike people, with deep disposition for the struggle. Its fight has been so intense that it is provoking successive crises politics in the country, firstly the one that took down of the then president Gonzalo Sánchez of Lozada in 2003 and now "War of the Gas". On the other hand, and contradictory, in spite of the force of the masses movement, of the political pressure that this exercises, this movement didn't develop, in a first moment, in a revolutionary direction. This is extremely serious, because the logic of the capitalist system indicates that the repression is a proportional variation the popular mobilization, what means that as the mobilization of masses grows, the repression will be enlarged, in way can do to culminate in a Dictatorship, that would have the mission of destroying the popular organization focus.
In this sense, it is necessary to escape of the mere allusive greetings and to analyze the crisis in Bolivia of a materialistic point of view. To indicate which the possibilities and weaknesses of the masses movement toward the current political crisis. It this that we will do starting from the bakuninist method materialistic.

1 - Characterization of the Situation and of the Alternatives in Bolivia.

Firstly, we should characterize the social situation in that Bolivia (processed between May and June of 2005), when the crisis seemed to take a definition. We can say that Bolivia lives a pre-revolutionary situation. Because: 1) a great popular mobilization exists; 2) the economy of the country is paralyzed due to such mobilization; 3) its opened up a political crisis that took her resigns of the president and the a vacuum of power; 4) direct and constant shocks of the masses movement with the repressive’s State organisms, police and army.
The current moment is a pre-revolutionary situation and not a revolutionary situation. This because, up to now the people are not still in weapons. This is the only objective condition that lacks for the formation of a revolutionary situation. The subjective conditions were given by the political work of more than 10 years of the different workers organized movements. The masses movement could precipitate for action, the formation of the revolutionary situation (with the socket of Barracks, for instance).
In case this factor comes the if it adds to the others, a revolutionary situation will be given. It is there the responsibility for the victory or it defeats of the Bolivian proletariat will be in the hands of Partys and organized Social Movements. It is only a political action guided by a theory and a program can take to the victory of the people.
At this time, we can say that two alternatives formulated by the opposition movements to the Carlos Mesa Government and the Liberal Regime come toward the Bolivian proletariat and the history. One is the reformist and democratic-bourgeois way, represented principally by of the MAS of Evo Morales. Another would be the revolutionary way, virtually possible, but that could not indicate the existence of forces capable to guarantee them today in Bolivia. This is an enigma.
The reformist way presented as solution the summons of new Elections and of a Constituent Assembly. This is the classic repertoire of the democratic-bourgeois oppositions. Before to pre-revolutionary situation, it is clear the proposal reformist's is conservative, will diverting the masses of the direction of the power assault.
The revolutionary way would indicate three solutions: 1) the general insurrection (the model of the Russian revolution of 1917); 2) the prolonged popular war (the model of the Chinese revolution and partly also of the Vietnamese revolution); 3) the guerrillas' of short duration war (the model Cuban and partly, the Algerian revolutions). The problem is that nor all revolutionary situation develops in the sense of the revolution, she can be retroactive for inter-classes commitments or even to be dissolved by the dictatorship or other form of bourgeois repression.
So that the revolutionary way consolidates, this is necessary three basic conditions: 1) the existence of a Revolutionary Party or at least of a Revolutionary Front (as teaches the case of Algeria) of national performance, that it guarantees a strategy and unified direction of struggle and the militarization of the popular movement in the correct moment; 2) the existence of a strong Masses Movement, influenced by such a party or front; 3) the formulation of a Program, that it makes possible the agglutination of most of the masses for the power assault.
It is necessary to know such conditions exist in Bolivia today. And in case they don't exist, there they will probably be the reasons of the impasses that the Bolivian proletariat will face. The masses movement, that the world left should greet with enthusiasm, soon will be before this impasse. Will it be necessary to throw a revolutionary offensive, but will conditions exist for such?. If conditions exist, will the preferential way would be it of the general insurrection and if this to fail will remain the prolonged popular war. But to the that seems such conditions they don't exist. One of the main leaders of the opposition, Evo Morales, of the BUT (I Move to the Socialism), its has an reformist programmatical orientation. As well as important popular organizations signed the "Pact of Unit", document in favor of the Constituent Assembly. She accepted to demobilize the people with agreement that guaranteed Eduardo Rodríguez, president of the Supreme Cut of Justice, as new president, that will summon general elections. The following way for important sections of the masses movement is the reformist way.
On the other hand it cannot seat and affirming not to be possible to do anything or to be necessary support the road democratic-bourgeois reformist apathetically. A revolution is not made of surprise, but it doesn't also take the same time to be prepared that the diamonds take to form. The working class and the revolutionary organizations can create for its conscious and organized action some that necessary conditions to the revolution.
Without the suitable conditions above, a General Insurrection in Bolivia would have few success chances. The Prolonged Popular War, that it would demand the previous formation of a popular army, it would not also be shown viable. It remains then the possibility of a War of Guerrillas of Short Duration that could develop either toward the prolonged popular war or general uprising or a combined form of the three,.
The guerrillas' war would be the viable alternative in these circumstances for two factors: 1) the character predominantly peasantry of the Bolivian movement; 2) the low degree of necessary military development for such; 3) the wear and tear and disorganization of the Bolivian State. Like this, the best alternative inside of the revolutionary way it would be the "Cuban model", in that the revolution was produced by the combination of the guerrillas' of short duration war with the masses actions.
This model will demand the socket of a series of measures: 1st) formation of a party and/or revolutionary front; 2nd) application of a politics formation of political leading and of economical managers; 3rd) formation of a clandestine military organism in the cities; 4th) formation of popular self-defense groups; 5th) formation of clandestine bases in the field, that will serve as guerrilla focuses and embryos of the popular army; 6th) creation of an International Net of Solidarity (search of support of popular movements in Latin America, especially in Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador); 7th) to establish the worker-peasantry control, as alternative the mere "nationalization"; 8th) formation of the Commune-Soviets as organisms of coordination of the struggles and activities of production-circulation that will be under proletarian control, this organism will become the territorial units base of the popular power later.
These measured seek to the formation of a “double power” in Bolivia: the power of the labor organizations and peasantry s existing in relationship of permanent tension with the power of State. They also seek to gain time without losing space, so that the militant proletariat can organize their political and military forces. It would be a form of trying to extract maximum of the current pre-revolutionary situation lived by Bolivia, without incurring in precipitations that can take the defeat. This is the most realistic solution (according to our understanding), being ruled in the analysis of the concrete historical experience and in the available data about the Bolivian situation today. Any country that is in a similar situation to the one of Bolivia would be confronted with the same impasses and alternatives.
We should escape of the romantic and willful analyzes. The victory of the Bolivian revolution depends on a correct strategy. But its still lacks to understand as and why in spite of a pre-revolutionary's situation formation, of the force of the popular movements, the revolution can be defeated. For that, it is necessary to analyze the evolution of the proletarian movement, of the political parties and their main ideas and strategies.

2 – Bolivia’s teachings for Brazilian and Latin-American Revolution.

The one that Bolivia already taught, and its will still teach for the Brazilian and World proletariat, it is exactly the degree of the force in that the popular movement can reach without walking necessarily for the revolutionary rupture. In this sense, we can say that case the situation in Bolivia develops for a civil war or be outlined by agreements, its gives us the following lessons (that will be discussed with larger theoretical depth in other occasions):

- it is necessary that the masses movement produces forms of conscience and organization revolutionaries, that its have a theory and a program, and that will guarantee the revolutionary direction and militarization of the masses movement in the correct moment. As Bakunin affirmed, it is "necessary the existence of an organization that guarantees the revolutionary direction to the proletariat for a prolonged preparation". The existence of a revolutionary organization based on the theoretical unit, tactics, collective responsibility and federalism is fundamental to the revolutionary process, as well as the constitution of a revolutionary army.
- but if this pre-condition is not verified, the proletariat will be immobilized by their own contradictions and it will surrender or it will be defeated by the repression of the bourgeoisie. The revolution is the war, and only for the war it is possible to destroy the bourgeois power. The bourgeoisie knows this true. The solution against the revolutionary war would the dictatorship. In the capitalist system, the enlargement of the quantity and quality of the masses organization has as against-departure the increase of the bourgeois organization. As it increases social polarization around material claims (as it happens in Bolivia regarding the control of the Gas), the final solution on the classes conflicts will only be given by the violence. The tendency then is that the dictatorship is the solution found by the bourgeoisie, even if a "constitutional dictatorship", dictatorship disguised under democratic mechanisms, as we already testified in Latin America. When the masses movement faces a pre-revolutionary situation, if he doesn't dispose would revolutionary organizations prepared for such, the bourgeoisie will have time of to rearrange their forces and to throw an offensive to destroy the masses movement. It is that that the Bolivian bourgeoisie tries to do when gathering the National Congress in Sucre, and when moving troops of the army for the capital of the country, La Paz, and to do agreements to guarantee elections, at the same time in that Vaca Diéz, of MIR, tries to articulate "military way”. The agreements give time for the Bolivian State self reorganizes and to disarticulate the popular movement for the repression and co-optation.

- another lesson, is the one that shows the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and the importance of the ethnic contradictions for the classes struggle. The economical crisis of Bolivia is directly linked to the social inequality among a mass of indigenous peasantry and a bourgeoisie criolla that it controls the agribusiness. In the current stage of the world capitalism, Latin America occupies an sudorinated place in the international division of the work, a position fundamentally agrarian-exporter, as it is the case of Bolivia. The economical contradictions between rural bourgeoisie and peasantry and rural proletariat will took strategic dimension. The case of Bolivia indicates that analyses contained in our document “The Social Revolution in Brazil" (2004), and “The Lula's Reforms and to Tasks of the Proletariat”" (2005), at least still in the current conjuncture, are correct.

The current situation of Bolivia deserves the attention of the international proletariat. We should support, but also to interpret theoretical and critically all of the steps of the movements of masses. This crisis in Bolivia offers important lessons for Brazilian and World Revolution. It is also to show the function of the bakuninist theory in the elucidation of the main problems of the revolution.

Working class - Nor a Step Behind!
The People will Win!